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The target date for a referendum to decide on Bougainville’s political future has been set as 15 June 2019. The 
delayed referendum is a key milestone contained in a political settlement, the Bougainville Peace Agreement 
(BPA), which sought to reconcile a violent conflict from 1988–1997. The BPA sets out a roadmap towards 
attaining peace in Bougainville, through three interrelated ‘pillars’:
• autonomy arrangements; 
• constitutionally guaranteed referendum; and 
• a weapons disposal plan.
Significant achievements have been made towards peace building in Bougainville since the signing of the BPA 
in 2001. In addition to the absence of large-scale violence, the attainment of three important milestones are 
evidence of the strengths of the agreement: 
• the coming into effect of the constitutional arrangements for autonomy and referendum; 
• implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan contained in the BPA; and 
• the holding of the first election of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) and establishment of 
government structures. 
Not detracting from the enormity of these successes, progress on a number of BPA provisions has been evaluated 
as unsatisfactory. Two dominant themes identified in this report are: 
• Bougainville has the potential to exercise wide powers and functions as intended by the BPA. Effective 
implementation of these powers, however, has been limited by resourcing and coordination problems within 
the ABG; weak collaboration with the National Government; and delayed payment of grants; and
• although implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan contained in the BPA is technically complete, an 
unknown number of weapons remain in circulation in Bougainville, and numerous groups and individuals 
are thought to remain a threat to the ongoing peace process. 
• The objectives of this report are to:
• review the progress made in implementing the BPA, noting the key elements and assessing progress made 
to date; 
• provide the ramifications of any shortfalls that may impact on the preparations for and the outcome of the 
referendum; and
• the three pillars of the BPA provide the primary parameters. 
The report is structured according to the three interdependent pillars of the BPA, beginning with autonomy, and 
followed by weapons disposal and referendum. The chapter on referendum includes a discussion of international 
standards of ‘good governance’ and ‘free and fair’, as these concepts are included in the BPA. The report then 
outlines possible risks and implications of identified shortfalls in implementation of the BPA on the referendum. 
Given that progress on implementing the BPA is still unfolding, as well as the absence of a second autonomy 
review (underway and expected in December 2018), these implications are possibilities to consider, rather than 
certainties. Key risks identified in the report include:
• a hasty transfer of remaining powers and functions without due regard to human and financial capacity;
Executive Summary
• inadequate information on autonomy and its outcomes to inform voter decision-making;
• continued proliferation of misunderstandings about the referendum;
• the presence of weapons and/or spoilers obstructing voting and undermining the credibility of the 
referendum;
• inappropriate handling of security and law and order issues during the referendum;
• localised conflict, in which weapons have been used in the past, re-emerging in the name of the referendum 
outcome; and
• significant practical challenges to informing voters of the referendum arrangements. 
Rather than focusing on the identified shortfalls as negatives however, they can also be seen as providing important 
insights into how the National Government and the ABG can continue to strengthen peace in Bougainville, 
regardless of the referendum outcome. These opportunities point towards:
• a considered approach to the handover of remaining powers and functions to the ABG;
• enhanced collaboration between the two governments and revitalisation of the concept of the BPA as a joint 
creation; 
• fostering deeper connections between the ABG and the broader community; and 
• maintaining current momentum on disarmament, unification and reconciliation. 
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The target date for a referendum to decide on Bougainville’s political future has been set as 15 June 2019. The 
delayed referendum is a key milestone of a political settlement which sought to reconcile a violent conflict in 
Bougainville from 1988–1997. The conflict involved a coalition of Bougainville groups that held a range of 
grievances (Regan, 2018, p.1), particularly relating to the distribution of revenues derived from the Panguna mine 
(McKenna, 2016, p. 85–93). A key event which escalated the conflict was an attack on mining infrastructure. In 
an attempt to regain control of the area, the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government responded by sending in 
police mobile squads (made up of non-Bougainvilleans). In the context of existing tensions between Bougainville 
and PNG, this action resulted in immediate claims of police brutality, and provided the “catalyst for mobilization 
of a wider secessionist rebellion” (Regan, 2010, p. 20). 
For some groups involved in the Bougainville conflict, independence from PNG was seen as the solution to 
their grievances. Others opposed independence and advocated a high degree of autonomy within PNG. Armed 
factions involved in the conflict were not universally supported. There was resentment towards the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA) for the withdrawal of government services following attacks on the mine, as well 
as the sea and air blockade imposed on Bougainville in May 1990. Those opposing the BRA formed what 
became known as the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF), which overtly pitted Bougainvilleans against 
Bougainvilleans and added new complexities and dimensions to the conflict. Bitter conflict both deepened 
support for independence, and generated divisions among Bougainvilleans, with the question of independence 
increasingly elevated as a core issue. 
1.1  The Bougainville Peace Agreement 
Following a number of what appeared to be unsuccessful peace efforts, war weariness and a stalemate provided 
momentum for negotiations between representatives of Bougainville and the National Government. A key 
outcome of the negotiations was the signing of the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA). This is a joint 
creation of the PNG National Government and Bougainville leaders (ABG, 2016a). Its core guiding principle 
is that “the governments of Bougainville and PNG must work together to secure lasting peace for Bougainville 
through peaceful means” (Bougainville Referendum Communications Committee, 2016, p. 2).
The BPA sets out a roadmap towards achieving peace in Bougainville through three interrelated ‘pillars’, overseen 
by a joint PNG–Bougainville institution – the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB): 
• autonomy arrangements for an autonomous Bougainville Government operating under a Bougainville 
Constitution and numerous guarantees contained in the National Constitution; 
• agreement to a constitutionally guaranteed referendum on Bougainville’s future political status, to be 
held 10–15 years after the election of the autonomous Bougainville Government. Separate independence 
for Bougainville must be among the choices available and the outcome subject to ratification of the PNG 
National Parliament; and
• a weapons disposal plan, including the withdrawal of remaining PNG security forces and containment 
of weapons overseen by the United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville (UNOMB) and the other 
relevant ex-combatant Commander (BPA, 2001, p. 1–2). 
Discussions held during the National Conference on the Bougainville Referendum in Port Moresby on 5–7 July 
2018 reflected the pride that PNG and Bougainville leaders alike feel towards the BPA. ABG President, John 
Momis, argued that there could not have been lasting peace in Bougainville without the BPA. In addition to the 
absence of large-scale violence, the attainment of three important milestones are evidence of the strengths of the 
agreement: 
• the coming into effect of the constitutional arrangements for autonomy and referendum; 
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• implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan contained in the BPA; and 
• the holding of the first election of the ABG and establishment of government structures. 
Bougainville is therefore approaching a fourth major milestone – a referendum, taking into consideration the 
status of weapons disposal and good governance (see Chapter 3). 
Not detracting from the enormity of these successes, it is recognised that progress on a number of provisions 
contained in the BPA has been unsatisfactory. Two major themes with implications for the referendum highlighted 
in this report are: 
• Bougainville has the potential to exercise wide powers and functions as intended by the BPA. Effective 
implementation of these powers, however, has been limited by resourcing and coordination problems within 
the ABG; weak collaboration with the National Government; and delayed payment of grants; and
• although implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan contained in the BPA is technically complete, an 
unknown number of weapons remain in circulation in Bougainville, and numerous groups and individuals 
are thought to remain a threat to the ongoing peace process. 
In the lead-up to the referendum, which must be held by 2020, it is important to consider both achievements 
and shortfalls in the implementation of the BPA, and any possible implications of these gaps on administration, 
conduct and outcome of the referendum. 
1.2 Report outline and scope
The objectives of this report as contained in the Terms of Reference are to:
• review the progress made in implementing the BPA, noting the key elements and assessing progress made 
to date; 
• provide the ramifications of any shortfalls that may impact on the preparations for and the outcome of the 
referendum; and
• the three pillars of the BPA provide the primary parameters. 
The findings presented in this report are based on a desktop analysis of government and non-government reviews 
of the implementation of the BPA. Two key documents provide a foundation for the review of progress. These 
are: 
• the 2013 Joint Review of Bougainville’s autonomy arrangements by Government of PNG and the ABG; and
• the 2012 United Nations (UN) evaluation of weapons disposal in Bougainville.
Reviews of the implementation of the three pillars of the BPA are limited in number. A crucial information 
gap is the absence of a second autonomy review to follow the first Joint Review of Bougainville’s autonomy 
arrangements undertaken in 2013 (JSB, 2013). Work on the second review is now underway and is expected to 
be available before December 2018 but was incomplete at the time of writing (October 2018). The BPA (2001, 
Part B (15)) requires a five-yearly, joint review of Bougainville’s autonomy arrangements, to be held through 
the JSB. As the ABG was established in 2005, the first of these reviews should have been undertaken in 2010 
but was three years late (JSB, 2013, p.1). The 2013 Joint Review acknowledges this delay “has deprived both 
governments of the opportunity to create a measurable baseline” (JSB, 2013, p. 5). 
It is important to note that the author of this report did not visit Bougainville and consequently the report 
does not contain new primary research. Rather, the report is a desktop review of implementation of the BPA 
drawing on secondary sources. A number of external reviews have been conducted on specific dimensions of the 
BPA (e.g. Ipp & Cooper, 2013; UN, 2012; UNDP, 2014), yet some of these are now somewhat out of date. 
The report also draws on academic papers and media coverage of current events unfolding in Bougainville. 
A recognised weakness in the implementation of the BPA, however, is inadequate understanding of its key 
provisions, both among political representatives and community members (JSB, 2013, p.14). This results in 
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the potential for misunderstandings and conflicting information being provided through the media in the lead-
up to the referendum. Given that progress on the implementation of the BPA is still unfolding, limitations in 
existing data and the aforementioned absence of a second autonomy review, the implications of any shortfalls in 
the autonomy arrangements and weapons disposal on the referendum outlined in this report are possibilities to 
consider, rather than certainties. A key learning from the National Conference on Bougainville Referendum is 
that political representatives and members of the public alike are frustrated by the lack of available information 
and debate on the BPA. This report seeks to address this gap while recognising these limitations.
For brevity and to avoid repetition, this report is situated in a series of publications led by the PNG National 
Research Institute on the Bougainville referendum. Cross-reference will be made to other research reports in this 
series to provide the reader greater background detail on the Bougainville referendum in comparative perspective 
(Qvortrup, 2018), projections towards outcomes issues (McVeigh & Bell, 2018) and financing fiscal autonomy 
(Chand, 2018). The report does not aim to compete with existing resources on the founding of Bougainville’s 
autonomy arrangements (Regan, 2013; Wolfers, 2007), nor can it engage with the complex negotiations which 
shaped the content of the BPA (see for example, Regan, 2002). 
The report is structured according to the three interdependent pillars of the BPA, beginning with autonomy, 
followed by weapons disposal, and concluding with the referendum. The chapters on autonomy and weapons 
disposal contain three components: 1) key provisions outlined in the BPA, 2) assessment of progress; and 3) 
shortfalls identified. The chapter on referendum is slightly different in that it includes a discussion of international 
standards of ‘good governance’ and ‘free and fair’ due to the inclusion of these concepts in the BPA. The report 
concludes with a detailed discussion of possible risks and implications of identified shortfalls on preparations, 
conduct and outcome of the referendum. 
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This chapter introduces readers to provisions contained in the BPA for Bougainville’s autonomous status. This is 
followed by a review of progress to date, structured according to the order of subsections of Part B of the BPA, 
and informed by key issues highlighted in the 2013 Joint Review. The primary areas examined in this chapter are: 
• establishment of government structures and ABG institutions;
• exercise of powers and functions;
• fiscal autonomy; and 
• impacts of autonomy and community perceptions.
2.1 Key provisions
After the signing of the BPA, progress on the Bougainville peace process was deemed to have been ‘unusually 
positive’ (Regan, 2002, p. 116). Key to this success was a consensus reached between opposing groups that a 
change in the political relationship between Bougainville and PNG was needed to end the conflict (Regan, 2002, 
p. 117). Although Bougainvilleans held different views on what the nature of this relationship should look like, 
support for autonomy was almost universal (Bougainville Constitutional Commission, 2004, p. 57). 
In summary, the provisions for Bougainville’s autonomous status were intended to provide Bougainville with: 
• a high degree of freedom to choose its own government structures; 
• the potential to exercise wide powers and functions;
• the ability to establish its own public service, police, judiciary and correctional service; 
• financial arrangements that partially guarantee grant funding while Bougainville seeks to move to fiscal self-
reliance using a wide range of taxation measures; and 
• a system for intergovernmental relations intended to promote cooperation and under which Bougainville 
will enjoy a high degree of independence of control by the National Government (Regan, 2002, p.120). 
Bougainville’s autonomy arrangements are complex, wide reaching and differ from the provincial government 
status of other areas of PNG. The BPA autonomy provisions are also complimented by the following implementing 
laws: 
• Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (AROB); 
• Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea; and 
• Organic Law on Peace Building in Bougainville-Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville 
Referendum (‘Organic Law’).
 The main dimensions of autonomy contained in the BPA (Part B) relate to: 
• objectives of autonomy;
• boundaries;
• Bougainville Constitution;
• structures of the autonomous Bougainville Government;
• division of powers and functions;
• agreed arrangements concerning exercise of National Government powers in relation to Bougainville;





• intergovernmental relations; 
• states of emergency;
• judiciary; 
• criminal law; and
• regular reviews of autonomy arrangements. 
2.2 Progress
2.2.1  Establishment of government structures and ABG institutions
Implementation of the autonomy arrangements began with the drafting, enactment and coming into operation 
of a number of constitutional laws.1,2 This included creating a Bougainville Constitution to provide for the 
organisation and structure of an autonomous Bougainville government. The Bougainville Constitution was 
created and passed in 2004, following three main steps: 
1. a Bougainville Constitutional Commission prepared a draft, broadly representative of the people of 
Bougainville;
2. the draft was considered, amended and finally adopted by a Bougainville Constituent Assembly; and
3. the PNG National Executive Council endorsed the adopted draft Constitution (Bougainville Constitutional 
Commission, 2004, p. 2). 
The Bougainville Constitution requires that it be reviewed before evaluations of Bougainville’s autonomy 
arrangements, such as the JSB Reviews of autonomy. The logic of a review of the Constitution before these 
reviews is that it “should help to illuminate matters that may need to be [dealt] with in the wider review process 
in relation to the autonomy arrangements more generally” (Bougainville Constitutional Commission, 2004, p. 
288). The Constitutional Review however, was not conducted before the 2013 Joint Review and is therefore a 
breach of the constitutional laws (JSB 2013, p. 6). Both governments agreed that the Bougainville Constitution 
should be reviewed by the ABG in 2014 to inform the second joint review due in 2015 (JSB, 2013, p. 6). A 
2014 Constitutional Review was subsequently conducted, but the 2015 joint review is now three years later than 
anticipated, so the Constitutional Review may now be out of date.
The enactment of the Bougainville Constitution was a crucial landmark in Bougainville’s autonomous status. It 
established Bougainville’s government structures and allowed for the first elections of the ABG. Bougainville’s 
formal governance structure is divided into three divisions of power:
• Legislative – in the form of Bougainville’s House of Representatives (Parliament). This House is seated in the 
parliamentary buildings in Kubu, Buka;
• Executive – in the form of an elected President of the ABG and the AROB, ministers (selected from members 
of parliament) and the Bougainville Executive Council; and
• Judiciary – in the form of the Courts of Justice that operate in Bougainville. The region also retains the PNG 
Supreme Court as the highest level of its judiciary system (ABG, 2016b). 
The 2013 Joint Review deemed the establishment of these structures ‘partially complete’ once the House of 
Representatives and the Bougainville Executive Council were established (JSB, 2013, p. 59). Institutions yet to 
be established in 2013 were the autonomous system of courts for Bougainville and key audit and accountability 
1 This included an amendment to the PNG Constitution and the passing and coming into operation of the ‘Organic Law on Peace 
Building in Bougainville-Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum’. 
2 See: Regan (2002) for analysis of the content of these laws. 
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institutions, such as the Bougainville Ombudsman and the Auditor General (JSB, 2013, p. 60). A three-tier system 
of government consisting of the ABG, the Council of Elders and Village Assemblies has also been established 
(JSB, 2013, p. 61). Yet the 2013 Joint Review found these to be “fraught with structural and operational 
difficulties that, save for the ABG House of Representatives and the Bougainville Executive Council, the two 
lower tiers of government are hardly operating and a good number of them are not functioning altogether” (JSB, 
2013, p. 61). 
An important update on the 2013 Joint Review is that in March 2017, the ABG established the Ombudsman 
Commission Office for Bougainville to receive complaints about corruption by any ABG public servant, office 
or politician (Lahies, 2017). Aside from progressing one aspect of the autonomy arrangements, the need for 
enhanced commitments to transparency and accountability has been recognised and continues to remain a 
concern (JSB, 2013, p. 63). This is evident in the following recent statement by the ABG Office of Chief 
Secretary (ABG, 2018, p. 1): 
…we have faced high levels of institutional corruption and fraud, and many have actively sought 
to undermine efforts to implement good governance, public sector reform and sustainable peace 
(Office of Chief Secretary, 2018, p. 1).
As well as the new functions and powers available to the ABG (discussed later), the Constitution of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Organic Law contain provisions that allow for ABG 
institutions to be established, such as a public service and police force. The passing of the Bougainville Public 
Services (Management and Administration) Act 2014 means that Bougainville now operates its own public 
service. While the Bougainville Police Service and Community Auxiliary Police are in operation, they continue 
to operate within a framework of national law (Dinnen & Peake, 2013, p. 1) as “no Bougainville law relating to 
the establishment of and the provision of powers, functions and duties of the police service has been enacted” 
(JSB, 2013, p. 79). This indicates deficiencies in the status of Bougainville’s ownership of law enforcement and 
the maintenance of peace and order for public security (JSB, 2013, p. xi).
2.2.2  Exercise of powers and functions
The BPA provides for a gradual realisation of autonomy through the transfer of powers and functions from the 
National Government to the ABG. It was accepted during the peace negotiations that the ABG would need time 
to develop the capacity to implement laws and undertake functions that had never been its responsibility. At 
the same time, there was recognition of the “Bougainville concern that considerations of capacity and resources 
should not constitute insurmountable obstacles…” (Regan, 2013, p. 433). 
The BPA outlines a ‘two list system for dividing powers and functions’ between the National Government and 
the ABG. The National Government powers are consistent with those traditionally associated with national 
sovereignty (e.g. foreign relations, immigration and currency). In contrast, the Bougainville powers and functions 
are organised into three main categories: 
• functions and powers ‘inherited’ by the ABG from the Interim Bougainville Provincial Government at the 
time the ABG was established; 
• 59 functions and powers available to the ABG under section 290 (2) of the PNG Constitution; and
• an additional five sub-categories of functions and powers available to the ABG under other provisions of the 
PNG Constitutional laws (JSB, 2013, p. 20). 
The method for the transfer of powers and functions to the ABG is outlined in:
• the BPA (Part B (7));
• Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (Sec. 295–297); 
• the Organic Law (Sec. 3–6); and 
• The Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (Sec. 43). 
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In the spirit of the BPA as a joint creation, both governments are obliged to collaborate on the transfer of eligible 
powers and functions to the ABG but the transfer process has been slow and remains incomplete. Aside from 
limited capacity and funds (discussed later), Regan (2013, p. 433) outlines three reasons why not all autonomy 
powers envisioned in the BPA have been drawn down: 
• the complexity of the arrangements; 
• a change of virtually all key PNG personnel since the 2001 agreement was negotiated; and
• limited political commitment on the part of ministers in the PNG government (Regan, 2013, p. 433). 
In 2006, the ABG requested the transfer of 34 powers and functions out of the available 59 (JSB, 2013, p. 8). As 
at 31 July 2013, the 2013 Joint Review outlined the status of transfer of powers and functions through ‘proposed 
legislation’ shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: 2013 Status of transfer of powers (JSB, 2013, p. 8–9)
No. Proposed legislation 2013 status 
1. Bougainville Public Service • Bougainville Executive Council (BEC) has approved 
drafting instructions.
• Second draft to be reviewed by Joint Technical 
Working Group week of 10 November.
• Legislation in house early December 2013.
2. Bougainville Public Finance • Drafting instructions available week of 14 October.
• Bill based on Sir James Frazer’s 2005 draft and PNG 
Public Finance (Management) Act.
• Most of the issues had been addressed by the Joint 
Technical Working Group with the Department of 
Finance.
• Legislation in house early December 2013.
3. Bougainville Mining (Transitional 
Arrangement) Bill 
• 2nd draft complete and approved by BEC. ABG 
engaged in consultations with the Mineral Resources 
Authority and Department of Mining Policy.
• To be introduced into Special House sitting in early 
November 2013.
• Widespread public consultation to follow in its 
final stage, and BEC is happy with the current draft 
(Funding needed for consultations).
4. Bougainville Marine Resource Authority • BEC policy paper and drafting instruction to be 
prepared.
• Draft law prepared by former adviser will be 
reviewed.
5. Bougainville Environment Bureau • Policy paper approved by BEC.
• Notice of intention under section 290 has been 
given to the National Government.
• Preparation of drafting instructions is underway.
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No. Proposed legislation 2013 status
6. Education • BEC has approved the Bill. In house October special 
sitting.
7. Inward investment • BEC has approved the Bill. In house October special 
sitting.
8. Heath • Initial discussions held with national Department of 
Health and progress towards MoU.
• Next step policy submissions to BEC.
9. Commodities • Policy paper to be prepared for BEC for 
Commodities Board.
10. Works • Agreed work plan being implemented including 
transfer of staff, budget and assets with target date 
2015 but could be earlier.
• Policy paper to be prepared for Infrastructure 
Services Bill.
11. Police • 2003 delegation operational; 2012 revised draft is to 
be finalised and signed.
• Policy paper to BEC in 2014.
12. Community development • MoU signed on 23 October 2013.
13. Bougainville time zone • BEC has approved. Drafting instructions needed to 
start working on it.
14. Council of Elders validation for Tsitalato, 
Halia, Tonsu and Tsitalato 
• Recently approved by BEC. Work is underway and 
should be ready for the special October session of 
the house.
15. Mining safety • Working Committee is working in developing the 
drafting instructions for the bill.
16. Bougainville Women’s Federation • Hasn’t gone to BEC yet, but members of the 
Federation are consulting with us for this Bill. 
Drafting in progress.
• Immediate need to resolve the legal issue with the 
PNG National Council of Women. 
17. Flags, emblems etc • Policy paper to be prepared.
18. Customary land • Policy paper to be prepared.
19. Alienated land • Policy paper to be prepared.
As of 10 August 2018, the ABG website (ABG, 2016d) lists 75 acts passed in the Bougainville House of 
Representatives from 2005 to 2017. Since the 2013 Joint Review, 23 acts have been passed. Table 2 presents an 
update of acts passed, against proposed legislation contained in the 2013 Joint Review.
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Table 2: 2018 Status of transfer of powers
No. Proposed legislation 2018 status 
1. Bougainville Public Service Bougainville Public Services (Management and 
Administration) Act 2014.
2. Bougainville Public Finance Bougainville Public Finance (Management and 
Administration) Act 2014.
3. Bougainville Mining (Transitional 
Arrangement) Bill 
Bougainville Mining (Transitional Arrangements) Act 
2014.
Bougainville Mining Act 2015.
Bougainville Mining (Amendment) Act 2015.
Bougainville Mining (Amendment) Act 2016.
4. Bougainville Marine Resource Authority No acts passed.
5. Bougainville Environment Bureau No acts passed.
6. Education Bougainville Education Act 2013.
7. Inward investment Bougainville Inward Investment Act 2013.
8. Heath Bougainville Health Partnerships Act 2017.
Bougainville Health Administration Act 2017.
9. Commodities No acts passed.
10. Works No acts passed.
11. Police No acts passed.
12. Community development No acts passed.
13. Bougainville time zone Bougainville Standard Time Act 2014.
14. Council of Elders validation for Tsitalato, 
Halia, Tonsu & Tsitalato 
No acts passed.
15. Mining Safety No acts passed.
16. Bougainville Women’s Federation No acts passed.
17. Flags, emblems etc No acts passed.
18. Customary land No acts passed.
19. Alienated land No acts passed.
Aside from this list of powers and functions ‘drawn down’ through legislation, it is difficult to calculate the exact 
number of powers that have now been transferred to the ABG. One complexity is that a number of powers have 
been transferred through the signing of memoranda of understanding (MoU) between the two governments, 
rather than acts passed in the Bougainville House of Representatives. A notable example is an MoU signed in 
March 2008 on the handover of mining, oil and gas powers which preceded the 2015 Bougainville Mining 
Act (see Table 2). The MoU outlined a 15-step process for the transfer, resulting in a joint plan (supported by 
the World Bank) to establish a mining department in the ABG (JSB, 2013, p. 75). The 2013 Joint Review was 
critical of the use of an MoU in this transfer as it circumvented the strict time sequence of the constitutional 
processes for the transfer of powers and functions (JSB, 2013, p. 75). If the constitutional procedure had been 
followed, the 2013 Joint Review suggests the two governments would have been forced to attend to important 
deficiencies in the public service (JSB, 2013, p. 75). Nonetheless, the mining, oil and gas MoU set somewhat of a 
precedent as, by August 2013, another 13 MoUs had been signed across various sectors (JSB, 2013, p. 74). There 
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is limited information publicly available on the 13 MoUs, but one informant involved in the process suggests 
they vary in detail and regulatory substance. They do not include, for example, a 15-step process such as that 
contained in the mining, oil and gas MoU. 
On 20 March 2017, the two governments also signed an overarching MoU on the drawdown of powers to 
act as a guiding document for future transfers. This ‘overarching’ MoU was developed in response to concerns 
about a lack of understanding of Bougainville’s autonomy and transfer arrangements (discussed later), as well as 
coordination problems between the ABG and some National Government departments (ABG, 2016d, p. 43–
44). The MoU also intends to integrate different aspects of the transfer arrangements to “provide clear evidence 
to any agency or department called upon, under the transfer arrangements, to prepare for transfer, [and] of the 
commitment of both governments to the transfer process” (ABG, 2016d, p. 44). On the announcement of the 
overarching MoU, ABG Vice President, Raymond Masono, highlighted the ongoing need to ensure adequate 
human and financial resourcing to effectively execute the functions drawn down (Masono, 2017, p. 2). 
Progress on the autonomy arrangements is not only about the number of powers and functions transferred but the 
extent to which they have been transferred into appropriate laws, policies, strategic plans and programmes (JSB, 
2013, p. 19). A proposal for the establishment of a new Bougainville institution legally requires consideration 
of the financial and human resource competencies needed to exercise their new functions (JSB, 2013, p. 24). 
The 2013 Joint Review identified “serious capacity issues” across the Bougainville administration as one of the 
reasons that has limited Bougainville’s potential to drawdown the full list of powers and functions available to 
it (JSB, 2013, p. 49; 59). 
A particular challenge for the ABG is its limited human resources and budget (Nisira, 2017, p. 7; Parliamentary 
Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 14). This includes the absence of public policymakers 
experienced with the particular context of Bougainville (Nisira, 2017, p. 7). Employees that do have knowledge 
of policy development are mainly trained in the administration of PNG public service programmes, rather than 
Bougainville’s autonomy arrangements (Nisira, 2017, p. 7). Nisira (2017, p. 7) also reports difficulties attracting 
competent public servants from elsewhere in PNG “when they know housing, education and health services are 
of such low standards compared with those available in major urban centres such as [Port] Moresby and Lae” 
(Nisira, 2017, p. 7). The Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs (2017, p. 15) further 
notes the practical challenges of recruiting and maintaining staff in the absence of adequate funding and budget 
certainty. 
Changes in political leadership in both governments is also a factor. Bougainville has experienced the loss 
of a number of matured and revered leaders such as the late Alexis Sarei, Leo Hannett and Joseph Kabui 
(Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 15). These losses are compounded by 
political and administrative changes at the national government-level, resulting in the absence of senior national 
politicians and bureaucrats with a prior working relationship with Bougainville (JSB, 2013, p. 15). Some PNG 
leaders at the National Conference on Bougainville Referendum, however, dismissed claims that they do not 
understand the referendum and refute accusations that they do not understand the Bougainville situation 
enough.
One institution that has been particularly highlighted as in need of capacity and resourcing is the BPS. External 
evaluations of the BPS describe it as lacking in staffing and structure, leadership, management, accountability 
and professionalism (Dinnen & Peake, 2013a, p. 2; UNDP, 2014, p. 13; UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 19–20). 
The 2013 Joint Review raised inadequate resourcing of the police as a human rights issue (e.g. due to the 
overcrowding of police lockups in Buka) (JSB, 2013, p. 64). The review also found that police capacity to 
maintain law and order has been impeded by inadequate funding to rebuild infrastructure destroyed during 
the conflict. Restoration of this infrastructure is seen as a vital priority before the ABG requests the transfer of 
police powers and functions (JSB, 2013, p. 80). The ABG suggests, however, that the law and order situation is 
improving in Bougainville since the BPS was established in Torokina Wakunai, Arawa and Buin (ABG, 2016d, 
p. 7). The community-based CAP is also evaluated positively for working in accordance with local beliefs and 
collaboration with local-level government (e.g. the Council of Elders), clan leaders and chiefs (Dinnen & Peake, 
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2013a, p. 1). The UN (2016, p. 29) cites the CAP as an example of an innovative approach to policing in PNG 
that is having “measurable outcomes in terms of improved safety, security and access to justice for citizens”. 
While the CAP programme has been supported by the Government of New Zealand, in 2012 the ABG paid 
all of its allowances for the first time, “making it a more sustainable programme of Bougainville” (UNDPA & 
UNDP, 2012, p. 19). The concluding chapter of this report expands on a potential role for the CAP in providing 
security and preparations for the referendum.
2.2.3  Fiscal autonomy
During the peace negotiations it was acknowledged that the ABG would initially financially rely on grants 
from the National Government (Regan, 2013, p. 435). This was largely due to the absence of revenue from the 
Panguna mine and the destruction of infrastructure that supported the pre-conflict economy (Chand, 2018, 
p. 31). The BPA therefore contains a ‘grants system’ of financial assistance from the National Government 
to support Bougainville towards a goal of fiscal self-reliance,3  defined as “the year in which the revenue from 
company tax, 70 percent of Value Added Tax and customs duties is equal to the value of the recurrent grant on 
a sustainable basis” (BPA, 2001, Part B (Sec. 9 (137)). Four kinds of grants are listed:
• recurrent unconditional grants; 
• restoration and development grants (RDGs); 
• specific purpose conditional grants, including the recurrent grant for policing, and;
• the one-off establishment grant (BPA, 2001, Part B (9c)). 
The RDGs have been most controversial of these grants. The ABG has criticised the National Government for 
delayed payments and calculation of the grants. Disagreements between the two governments peaked in 2010, 
when the national budget of that year did not include provision for the K15 million RDG (Wallis, 2012, p. 34). 
The ABG raised the issue at a JSB meeting in December 2009 to which “the PNG Government claimed that it 
regarded other kinds of funding as compensating for the grant.” (Wallis, 2012, p. 34). Although the National 
Government eventually agreed to pay the 2010 grant in February 2011, it was over 14 months late (Regan, 
2013, p. 438). Problems with timeliness continued the following year as the payment of the 2011 grant was 
almost another 10 months late (Regan, 2013, p. 438). Further to these delays, the 2010 and 2011 payments 
“were not calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Organic Law [sub-sections 49(1) and (2)) on 
annual adjustment of the grant, resulting in significant underpayments for both years” (Regan, 2013, p. 438). In 
2013, the ABG again challenged the National Government on calculation of grants payable, demonstrating that 
the 2013 payment should have been K66 million and not the K15 million received (JSB, 2013, p. 36). 
At a JSB meeting in December 2017, the two governments attempted to resolve the dispute and reached a 
two-fold compromise. First, they agreed that the amount owing to the ABG was K437 million. Of this sum, 
K40 million will be paid in 2018 and a further K95 million to be paid in 2019, “subject to prevailing economic 
conditions” (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 66). The remaining K302 million “is to be financed by [the] National 
Government in 2018 and onwards” (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 66). The second compromise is that the two 
governments will develop a new formula to clarify RDG payments for 2018 and the years to come. 
Participants at the National Conference on Bougainville Referendum considered this compromise a breakthrough, 
for which President Momis and Prime Minister O’Neill deserve credit. Yet the ABG remains uncertain as to 
whether National Government will be in a position to meet the agreed repayments for either 2018 or 2019 
(Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 66). This is due to the financial strains it is experiencing, particularly following 
the 2018 earthquake in Hela province and a significant national budget shortfall (Banks & Namorong, 2018).
Adding to fears that the National Government is not delivering on its financial obligations contained in the BPA, 
is the failure to pay the ABG significant amounts of tax revenue due to accounting errors (JSB, 2013, p. 55-56). 
According to the Chief Bougainville Collector of Taxes, the total amount outstanding is between K3 million 
3 For an in-depth analysis of the progress made on fiscal autonomy, see Chand (2018). 
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and K5 million (JSB, 2013, p. 55-56). The inability of PNG tax authorities to clarify the amounts payable to 
the ABG for the two main taxes in question, personal income tax and stamp duty, adds to the confusion (Regan, 
2013, p. 439). 
Even allowing for delays and miscalculations on monies owed to the ABG, the 2013 Joint Review found that 
neither government has scored well on making effective use of grants (JSB, 2013, p. 56). Reasons provided for 
this include:
• lack of plans and high degree of disconnect between project financing; 
• little or no documentation to support individual projects; 
• weak monitoring of projects and their implementation (although improving); 
• lack of scrutiny of quarterly reports and some major expenditures; 
• lack of strategic prioritisation; and
• lack of people in the administration to manage the financial system and to implement projects (JSB, 2013, 
p. 48). 
Some in ABG circles, however, divert blame for poor outcomes to the slow transfer of powers and functions to 
the ABG and incorrect calculations of the RDG. As former ABG Vice President, Patrick Nisira (2017, p. 10), 
argues: 
…in the absence of the correct levels of RDG, we in the ABG could be excused for feeling that 
our role has been reduced to little more than oversight of basic service delivery! So much for the 
goal of achieving self-determination through autonomy. 
Yet Nisira’s frustrations might be symptomatic of a broader and unanticipated outcome of the grants. Questions 
have been raised by analysts of Bougainville’s financial arrangements as to whether the grants contained in the 
BPA have set the conditions for fiscal dependency. As Chand (2018, p. vii) writes: 
…what was not anticipated by the architects of the legislation on fiscal transfers was the fact that 
‘gap-filling’ grants eroded the incentives for the ABG to grow its own tax base. The mandatory 
nature of the grants lent the incentives for the ABG to blame the National Government for 
shortfalls in funding and supply of public services. 
From 2002 to 2013, 80 percent of the ABG budget had been derived from national government grants (JSB, 
2013, p. 39). In 2016, the value of recurrent grant was K41.3 million, whereas “revenues from company taxes, 
custom duties, and 70 percent of value added taxes amounted to K2.4 million” (Chand, 2018, p. v). This means 
that by 2016, the ABG had reached “just 6 percent of the distance to fiscal self-reliance” (Chand, 2018, p. v), 
while “on the broader considerations of fiscal autonomy, revenues from all internal sources for 2016 amounted to 
K23.2 million; that is, equal to 56 percent of the value of recurrent grant provided to the ABG by the National 
Government” (Chand, 2018, p. v). 
Deficient internal revenue generation is partly attributed to a Bougainville economy which “is too small to 
generate the tax revenues needed to finance itself ” (JSB, 2013, p. 44). Although there have been moves to expand 
the internal tax base by imposing a sales tax on alcohol and tobacco (Regan, 2013, p. 437), enforcement and 
collection of this revenue has also suffered weak capacity within the Bougainville administration (JSB, 2013, p. 
50). Other factors identified in the 2013 Joint Review to have inhibited growth in the local economy are: 
• delays in policymaking to enable access to customary land for economic development due to delays in the 
transfer of powers and functions to the ABG Division of Lands;
• insufficient attention to agriculture despite 90 percent of citizens depending on ecosystem services (especially 
cocoa and copra) for their livelihood;
• a dilapidated large plantation sector; 
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• lack of access to markets for people based in remote areas; and
• law and order problems, poor access to credit and poor infrastructure (JSB, 2013, p. 27).
Research conducted by Chand (2018, p. vii) indicates an independent Bougainville nation would require a 
budget of approximately two to three times more than the total budget for the ABG in 2016, which was around 
K286 million. Large-scale mining has long-been viewed as a realistic means of improving Bougainville’s financial 
position and negotiations on the potential reopening of the Panguna mine have dominated this discussion. Key 
stakeholders, including President Momis, have argued that independence without the Panguna mine might not 
be possible (cited in Tlozek, 2017). Yet negotiations between the ABG and Panguna landowners on a potential 
return of Bougainville Copper Limited failed to reach a consensus and an indefinite moratorium on mining was 
subsequently imposed (Graue, 2018). Although this closed the door on Bougainville Copper Limited, attention 
to large-scale mining is not expected to cease as other companies are thought to be keen to invest (Graue, 2018). 
Alternative sources of revenue to support fiscal autonomy in Bougainville include: fishing resource rents (Chand, 
2018, p. 25); downstream processing of cocoa and copra; a targeted tourism industry; high value mid-altitude 
vegetables farming; and harnessing the labour and entrepreneurship of the large youth population (JSB, 2013, 
p. 28).
2.2.4 Impacts of autonomy and community perspectives
While recognising limitations in the data available, the 2013 Joint Review concluded that the “autonomy 
arrangements have had limited social impact on the lives of citizens” (JSB, 2013, p. 29). The main justifications 
provided for this finding are: 
• service delivery has not yet reached pre-crisis levels;
• many social and economic divisions have poor levels of capacity (human resources and funding); and
• most ABG divisions are still in the process of drawing down powers and are not yet in a position to make 
appropriate laws and policies that would impact on the lives of citizens in ways that would be different under 
normal provincial government arrangements (JSB, 2013, p. 29). 
Access to health care and basic education are the primary human development concerns raised in the 2013 Joint 
Review. Health services were found to be particularly poor in remote areas and access to basic education is well 
below universal (JSB, 2013, p. 31). The World Bank (2016) also reports that “Bougainville is only beginning 
to recover: many essential services, like health care, are scarce and poorly maintained”. There are particular 
concerns about the impacts on women and children, given Bougainville has some of the highest rates of maternal 
mortality in the Asia-Pacific region (World Bank, 2016). Limited infrastructure and impassable terrain add 
further challenges to accessing health services and education (World Bank, 2016). Yet lack of data, including 
level of access to basic services for marginalised populations (UN PNG, 2016, p. 17), remains an obstacle to 
evaluating the social and economic impacts of the autonomy arrangements.
Poor access to basic health care and education is a difficulty experienced by people across many provinces of PNG 
(JSB, 2013, p. 29). What is unique to Bougainville, however, is the “continuing social and psychological after-
effects of the conflict” (JSB, 2013, p. 29). This takes the form of trauma-related symptoms, grief, anger, alcohol 
and substance abuse, domestic violence and sexual assault (Tierney et al., 2016). A particular group identified 
at risk are young people in the age range of 16–30 years, and who were born or grew up during the conflict 
(Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 10). Referred to as the ‘lost generation’, 
many of these young people grew up with limited or no formal education, resulting in consequential problems 
such as illiteracy, unemployment and social dislocation (Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville 
Affairs, 2017, p. 10). Community consultations undertaken by the UN in 2012 identified undereducation 
and drug abuse by young people as among their top three concerns (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 22). The 
UNDP (UNDP, 2014, p. 23), however, challenges the negative portrayal of young Bougainvilleans as there 
are many exceptional cases. Calls have been made for increased engagement with the ‘lost generation’ as they 
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will constitute the bulk of young people who will be participating in the upcoming referendum (Parliamentary 
Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 10). 
Reasons given in the 2013 Joint Review for the unsatisfactory social benefits of Bougainville’s autonomy to 
date largely highlight planning and coordination problems in the ABG (JSB, 2013, p. 27). These include, for 
example, an absence of a cohesive strategy in the drawdown of powers that are dispersed across various divisions 
and economic sectors, and the development of new buildings without links to the recurrent budget and staffing 
(JSB, 2013, p. 27). The review suggests this outcome primarily stems from “an absence of a vision for the type of 
Bougainville society people should be encouraged to aspire to” (JSB, 2013, p. 28) – a weakness that is impeding 
strategic planning and adherence to basic service delivery aspirations (JSB, 2013, p. 28). A UNDP report (2014, 
p. 23) echoes this criticism, noting a lack of administrative direction in the design and implementation of 
programmes and the strategic use of funding. 
Another insight of the 2013 Joint Review (JSB, 2013, p. 29) is a mismatch between the perceptions of ABG 
representatives and the reality on the ground. The review documented significant impatience across Bougainville 
on a lack of observable outcomes, highlighting six main themes:
• the people do not know what is happening. Both governments have been implementing projects and services 
are being restored. However, the impact is not recognised or being attributed to autonomy; 
• the public service is seen widely as deficient with a serious lack of capacity; 
• services are not meeting the needs of the people; 
• the National Government is widely blamed for not funding Bougainville’s restoration; 
• corruption and a lack of transparency over projects is a serious and emerging issue; and 
• the people feel that they are not involved in decision-making, nor are they consulted (JSB, 2013, p. 18). 
A key difference noted in 2013 compared with earlier observations is that many of these frustrations were being 
directed towards the ABG, rather than the National Government exclusively (JSB, 2013, p.14). The UNDP 
(2014, p. 12) suggests this is because the ABG is now the main governance actor most identifiable to the people. 
This is supported by Patrick Nisira, who writes: 
…the much slower than anticipated progress in transfer of powers has resulted in frustration, 
and contributed to widespread criticism of the ABG for lack of performance, and failure to meet 
expectations (Nisira, 2017, p. 7).
A more recent report of the Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs (2017, p. 12) indicates 
a continuation of community frustrations about progress on autonomy. The report revealed: 
• fears that the JSB is not effectively meeting the demands of the ABG and “that it was in danger of becoming 
a ‘rubber stamp’ and existing at the behest and convenience of the national government”; 
• uncertainty about the National Government’s understanding of, and commitments to, Bougainville’s 
autonomy arrangements; 
• the slowness in the drawdown of powers and responsibilities – and institutions in some instances – from the 
national government to the ABG; 
• concern about funding from the national government (which overshadowed all other concerns); 
• autonomy is a misunderstood concept and often used interchangeably with independence; and
• people need to know and understand the BPA before the autonomy issue is properly grasped (Parliamentary 
Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 12).
In another study, the UNDP (2014, p. 11–12) engaged in community consultations with 1,100 people across 
Bougainville. While this report is broader in scope than the autonomy arrangements per se, it supports many of 
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the frustrations noted earlier: 
• confusion at all levels about division of powers and functions between the National Government and the 
ABG;
• difficulties in the collaboration between the National Government and ABG; 
• a disconnect at many levels within the ABG (political, administrative and legislative components); and
• a major disconnect between the ABG and the citizens of Bougainville (UNDP, 2014, p. 13). 
Adding to community frustrations and uncertainty about the benefits of autonomy is the 2013 Joint Review 
finding that “the lack of understanding in Papua New Guinea and Bougainville of the autonomy arrangements 
is the single largest issue facing PNG and Bougainville today” (JSB, 2013, p. 14). A more recent study of 
communications in Bougainville (Thomas et al., 2017) suggests this remains a key issue. Reporting on a survey of 
1,114 community members in Bougainville, the study found 77 percent feel unsure or do not know much about 
the BPA, and 83 percent feel they do not receive enough information on related topics (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 
9). Representatives of the ABG, public servants and the community alike continue to call for greater information 
on the autonomy arrangements to go hand-in-hand with awareness on the referendum (Parliamentary Bipartisan 
Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 15).
Aside from the limited reach of media sources in Bougainville (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 2), the 2013 Joint Review 
directs blame at both governments for the lack of understanding of the autonomy arrangements among political 
leaders and the Bougainville public (JSB, 2013, p. 15). On the one hand, it criticises the ABG for failing to 
“present a united vision of what autonomy is and how it benefits the people of Bougainville” (JSB, 2013, p. 15). 
On the other hand, it argues that the National Government has “not demonstrated a coordinated approach to 
understanding its critical role in making autonomy work” (JSB, 2013, p. 15). 
2.3	 Shortfalls	identified
Some progress has been made on implementing the governance and administrative aspects of autonomy. 
Key milestones include enacting the Bougainville Constitution, establishing the Bougainville House of 
Representatives and founding Bougainville’s own public service. Yet, overall, progress has been evaluated as 
slower than anticipated, primarily attributed to the absence of a clear and cohesive strategy on autonomy, weak 
coordination between the two governments on its implementation, and capacity and resourcing weaknesses in 
the Bougainville administration. 
2.3.1  Slow drawdown of powers and coordination problems 
A particular shortfall identified is the slow drawdown of powers and functions from the National Government 
to the ABG. Those powers that have been drawn down have been evaluated as “highly fragmented with each 
department (division doing its own thing), resulting in lopsided and uneven progress” (JSB, 2013, p. 61). The 
main update to the 2013 Joint Review on the transfer of powers and functions is that 23 acts have been passed 
in the House of Representatives since 2013. Thirteen MoUs have also been signed across a range of sectors, and 
one new overarching MoU on the future drawdown of powers. The full status of the powers and functions is 
unclear, however, as there is a dearth of public information and analysis on this. 
Failure to follow the constitutional processes for the transfer of powers and functions through the signing of 
MoUs has also been criticised as it has not forced the two governments to respond to important deficiencies in 
the public service. It is possible to argue, therefore, that the ABG has the potential to exercise wide powers and 
functions as intended by the autonomy arrangements, but the potential to do this effectively has been limited by 
human and financial resourcing and coordination issues. The concluding chapter discusses the need for clarity 
on the status of powers and functions, as well as the risks that could be associated with a hasty transfer before or 
after the referendum.
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2.3.2  Capacity, resourcing and service delivery concerns
Particular concerns have been raised about the capacity and resourcing of the BPS. No new pieces of legislation 
related to the police have been passed since 2013 and as already noted, the BPS continues to national law 
(Dinnen & Peake, 2013a, p.1). Lack of funding to rebuild police infrastructure destroyed during the conflict is 
considered a major setback. 
Also concerning to external organisations is the state of health and education services in Bougainville, with 
particular impacts on women and young people. Limited development outcomes and social benefits of the 
autonomy arrangements have been attributed to lack of strategic planning in the Bougainville administration, 
which is noted as suffering significant resourcing and capability weaknesses. 
2.3.3  Delayed payments and miscalculations of grants 
Monies owing to the ABG by the National Government have been controversial due to delayed payments, 
miscalculations and accounting errors. This is thought to have fuelled distrust of the National Government 
among the Bougainville public, raising questions as to whether it is committed to honouring the BPA. In 2017, 
however, the two governments met to resolve the dispute and agreed to a repayment plan. Still, the ABG remains 
uncertain as to whether PNG will be in a financial position to deliver on its promise. As funding from the 
National Government remains a dominant concern among the Bougainville public (Parliamentary Bipartisan 
Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 12), this is an issue that may need a proactive approach from the 
National Government to instil confidence among voters in the lead-up to the referendum. 
Bougainville is a long-way short of achieving fiscal self-reliance (Chand, 2018, p. 1). Aside from delayed payments 
of the RDG grant and limitations in the Bougainville economy, lack of cooperation between the ABG and 
National Government departments has again been noted as an explanatory factor (ABG, 2016d, p. 43–44). The 
Bougainville public are also thought to be worried about the effectiveness of the JSB in responding to the needs 
of the ABG and fulfilling its responsibility to facilitate intergovernmental relations (Parliamentary Bipartisan 
Committee on Bougainville Affairs (2017, p. 12). Collaboration between the two governments through the JSB 
on referendum preparations could therefore have the potential to diminish, or strengthen, the guiding principle 
of the BPA as a joint creation. 
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This chapter examines progress on disarmament in Bougainville, beginning with an introduction to the three-
stage Weapons Disposal Plan contained in the BPA and the complexities of determining compliance. The 
number, types and impact of weapons thought to remain in circulation in Bougainville today are then presented. 
This is followed by a discussion of recent ABG efforts to engage ‘outlying factions’ in the ongoing peace process, 
and advancements towards unification and reconciliation.
3.1 Key provisions
Part E of the BPA endorses a Weapons Disposal Plan to be implemented in three stages alongside the withdrawal 
of remaining PNG Defence Force and Police Mobile Unit personnel. As mentioned earlier, fulfilling the 
implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan would trigger amendments to the PNG Constitution to allow 
for a separate Bougainville Constitution and the holding of the first ABG elections (Nisira, 2017, p. 5). This was 
a strong incentive for armed factions to engage in the weapons disposal process (Nisira, 2017, p. 5), and provided 
the mutual security needed to finalise the BPA (Wolfers, 2007, p. 96).  
Stage one of the Weapons Disposal Plan commenced on 9 May 2001. This initial stage required ex-combatants 
willing to disarm to place their weapons in small lockable containers. These containers were held under the 
control of BRA and BRF unit commanders and sealed and verified by the UNOMB. Containers were distributed 
across Bougainville by Peace Monitoring Group helicopters, which also transported ex-combatants around 
Bougainville with the aim of encouraging women, chiefs and church leaders to convince their communities to 
disarm (Spark & Bailey, 2005, p. 605).
Stage two of the Weapons Disposal Plan required company commanders to place contained weapons into larger 
shipping containers at a number of central locations. Weapons were to remain in these double-locked containers 
until their final fate was decided. The BPA required one of the keys to the containers to be held by the UNOMB, 
and the other key by the relevant company commander (Spark & Bailey, 2005). 
A decision on the final fate of the weapons would mark attainment of stage three. The BPA required this decision 
be made “4 ½ months of the coming into effect of the constitutional amendments” (BPA, 2001, p. 65), which 
would be activated on UNOMB assessment of compliance to stages one and two of the Weapons Disposal Plan. 
A decision to destroy weapons was made in December 2003 and most were destroyed in 2004 (Spark & 
Bailey, 2005, p. 602). On 19 May 2005, the UNOMB determined that the Weapons Disposal Plan had been 
implemented and elections could be planned for the first Bougainville elections (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, 
p. 4). Parties to the BPA then agreed that it would be the responsibility of the ABG, in collaboration with the 
National Government, to address the issue of residual weapons (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 12). 
3.2 Progress
3.2.1  The UNOMB supervised process 
Based on UN (2008, p. 455) figures, the UNOMB supervised weapons disposal process resulted in:
• 2,016 weapons collected and kept in containers; 
• 1,896 weapons initially destroyed; 
• an additional 155 weapons collected and destroyed by the UNOMB; 
• 2,051 weapons destroyed in total.
Of the 2,051 weapons destroyed, 56 percent were homemade, while the remainder comprised: sporting/hunting 
weapons (16 percent); high-powered weapons (15 percent) and World War II rifles and machine guns (13%) 
(UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 12). Almost all of these weapons belonged to BRA and BRF fighters (UNDPA & 
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UNDP, 2012, p. 12).
One limitation of the Weapons Disposal Plan is that it is impossible to say what proportion of weapons present in 
Bougainville were collected and destroyed as a result of this process. This is because there “is no reliable estimate 
of the number of weapons present in Bougainville prior to the implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan” 
(UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 12). The UN does estimate, however, that the number of weapons not collected 
and destroyed could be around 600, but it is impossible to offer anything more than a rough guide (UNDPA & 
UNDP, 2012, p. 13). 
3.2.2  Complexities of ‘compliance’
The UNOMB held the decision-making power to determine what would constitute ‘significant compliance’ to 
the Weapons Disposal Plan (Spark & Bailey, 2005, p. 603). The BPA does not provide “a benchmark for what 
levels of disposal are acceptable” (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 49). 
It is recognised that the notion of ‘significant compliance’ is vague and continues to allow for different 
interpretations as to whether it was been achieved (Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 
2017, p. 18). This ambiguity stemmed from acknowledgement at the signing of the BPA that a number of 
individuals and groups remained outside of the peace process (Spark & Bailey, 2005, p. 603). In particular, 
negotiations failed to convince former BRA Supreme Commander, Francis Ona, and his Me’ekamui Defence 
Force (MDF), to join the peace process (Regan, 2002, p. 115). The Weapons Disposal Plan would therefore only 
secure a proportion of the weapons known to be in circulation. 
Completion of the weapons disposal process is also debateable as not all weapons were relinquished. Up to 120 
weapons were stolen from containers during stage two of the process (Woodbury, 2015, p. 9). It was also widely 
understood that some high-powered weapons held by BRA and BRF combatants were not handed in (Ipp & 
Cooper, 2013, p. 14; Nisira, 2017, p. 5; UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 10–11). This may have been “due to 
suspicion of PNG or of one another, or for the purpose of sale, or for use in criminal activities” (Nisira, 2017, 
p. 5). 
3.2.3  Weapons collected since 2005 
In 2002, there was “dramatic progress” on implementation of the BPA Weapons Disposal Plan (Regan, 2002, 
p. 123). This was attributed to the two-way link between the constitutional amendments that enabled the 
establishment of the ABG and the Weapons Disposal Plan (Regan, 2002, p. 123). Once the constitutional 
amendments had been made, however, momentum was lost and thought difficult to recover. Moreover, no 
formal ABG-led Bougainville-wide weapons disposal process immediately succeeded the Weapons Disposal Plan 
(UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 22). 
Localised conflicts in the South of Bougainville between 2004 and 2011 were another serious setback as they 
prompted the influx of weapons from within Bougainville and from the Solomon Islands (UNDPA & UNDP, 
2012, p. 23). Significant events documented in the UN (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 23) evaluation are: 
• the conflict in Siwai (2004–2007); 
• the arrival of Noah Musingku in Tonu in 2004; 
• the establishment of an armed unit to provide security to Musingku’s self-proclaimed ‘Kingdom of Papala’; 
• a 2006 attack on Musingku’s compound by the BPS in cooperation with the Bougainville Freedom Fighters; 
and
• localised conflict around Konnou (2006–2011).
A UN evaluation of weapons disposal (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 27) found that between 2005–2012, the 
ABG made little progress, meaning “the number of weapons present in Bougainville today may be largely the 
same as it was in 2005”. This is supported by Starygin (2013, p. 71) who argues that since 2005, “there has been 
no significant change” and by Ipp and Cooper (2013, p. 14) who argue that, “though the government recognizes 
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the need to remove weapons from community life, it has struggled to do so effectively”. Further, Central 
Bougainville MP, Sam Akoitai, told the audience at the National Conference on Bougainville Referendum that 
weapons disposal was taking so long that the governments need to identify a new approach (Radio New Zealand, 
2018).
Despite consistent evaluations of weapons disposal since 2005 as ‘slow’, there is limited data to support or 
deny this. Figures that do exist suggest only a small number of weapons have been handed in to the police as 
a result of local-level reconciliations and/or seized through criminal activities (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 
23). An unofficial weapons disposal programme between 2005–2007 supported by the New Zealand High 
Commissioner resulted in the surrender of approximately 12 weapons (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 23) and 
reconciliation and weapons disposal activities conducted by the UNDP between 2008–2010 collected less than 
10 weapons (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 23). A more significant, but undisclosed number of weapons have 
been contained under the authority of factional commanders and Chiefs as a result of the resolution of localised 
conflicts in the south of Bougainville (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 23). Yet as of 2012 (UNDPA & UNDP, 
2012, p. 23), no decision had been made on the final fate of these weapons. More recently, in April and June 
2018, internal reconciliations (discussed later) resulted in the destruction and disposal of another eight modified 
rifles, one active explosive and a sizeable quantity of small arms ammunitions (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 
70). 
3.2.4  Number of weapons in circulation 
Apart from the figures already listed, it is unclear how many weapons the ABG has collected and destroyed since 
the 2005 process and a database on weapons remaining in Bougainville is yet to be finalised (Blades, 2018). One 
estimate provided in 2015 is that there are up to “2000 arms of mixed quality still in circulation” and “14 armed 
militia groups still openly carrying weapons in southern Bougainville alone” (Woodbury, 2015, p. 10). Yet there 
is limited supporting evidence for this. Sources provided by Woodbury (2015, footnote 83) are: The Economist 
(2010) which provides the figure of 14 armed militia and roughly 1,500–2,500 weapons in circulation; and 
Starygin (2013, p. 56–76), who examines the personas of seven “protagonists of ‘Rambo-style leadership’ ” but 
does not provide figures on the number of weapons in circulation. Other reports simply refer to a “large number 
of weapons” yet do not provide specific records (Ipp & Cooper, 2013, p. 13; Wallis, 2012, p. 36). The notion of 
a ‘large number’ also contradicts the finding of the 2012 UN evaluation that, “a relatively small but potentially 
destabilising number of weapons remain in Bougainville” (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 1). 
Figures provided in the 2012 UN report include:
• a rough estimate that around 600 ‘residual crisis weapons’ remained after the implementation of the Weapons 
Disposal Plan; 
• it is impossible to estimate with accuracy the quantities of WWII remnants but “the numbers are likely to 
be significant”; 
• arms trafficking groups may have around 400–500 weapons at any one time; and
• although the BPS is officially unarmed, in 2009 it had access to 56 weapons of various types and distributed 
among police stations across Bougainville. But the evaluators were unable to verify the accuracy of the 
inventory on which this figure is based (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 12–16). 
A meeting of the JSB held on 15 December 2017 endorsed the ongoing need for a Joint Weapons Disposal 
Secretariat to collect data against which weapons disposal completion can be measured (Joint Technical Team, 
2018, p. 41). 
3.2.5  Types of weapons in circulation
Despite uncertainty about the number of weapons in circulation, Bougainville leaders and the public alike are 
concerned about the continued presence of firearms in communities (Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on 
Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 18). One concern is that “they could be used in the future to fuel further localized 
conflict or even to bring political pressure to bear on the ABG” (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 18). More broadly, 
many people in Bougainville are thought to believe that the availability of weapons is a threat to personal safety 
(Thomas et al., 2017, p. 78). 
Review documents suggest four main categories of weapons remain in circulation: 
• ‘residual crisis weapons’ not disposed of as part of the Weapons Disposal Plan (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, 
p. 12). These comprise firearms held onto by the various MDF factions; weapons supplied to former BRF 
members by contacts in the PNG Defence Force; and weapons possessed by BRA commanders that were 
not destroyed (Nisira, 2017);
• other ‘new’ weapons believed to have been brought into Bougainville since the BPA was signed (Regan, 
2016a, p. 18). These come to Bougainville from a range of sources such as smuggling and sale from the 
Solomon Islands (UNDP, 2014, p. 9);
• WWII remnants found in Torokina and other parts of Bougainville (Regan, 2016b, p. 18). Although deemed 
to be “more modest in quantities”, unexploded ordinance from WWII further contribute to the availability 
of weapons (Ipp & Cooper, 2013, p. 14); and
• police weapons (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 12) and weapons procured and held under the PNG Firearms 
Act (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 39). 
3.2.6  Impact of weapons 
While firearms are mostly not used in Bougainville, misuse does occur alongside alcohol and drug abuse 
(UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 18). This has negative consequences on women, who the UN suggests have been 
marginalised from playing a meaningful role in weapons disposal (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 21). In some 
areas of Bougainville, women are thought to be anxious to travel on the weekend (a time when men often drink 
alcohol) and fear retaliation if they report on the misuse of guns (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 22). The presence 
of firearms also weakens the authority of the BPS and the CAP (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 19). More broadly, 
they threaten the exercise of democracy in Bougainville and respect for basic human rights (Joint Technical 
Team, 2018, p. 44). This includes, for example, the use of firearms in extrajudicial killings of suspected sorcerers 
(UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 21). Yet the UN (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 18) reports that the presence of 
weapons in Bougainville rarely results in firearms-related injuries. Rather, injuries are more commonly inflicted 
by bladed weapons that are used as everyday tools for gathering food (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 18). This 
raises questions as to the types of ‘weapons’ that should be of most concern in the lead-up to the referendum. 
3.2.7  Weapons holders
Despite inadequate data on the number of weapons present in Bougainville, numerous armed groups and 
individuals are thought to still pose a threat to peace (Ipp & Cooper, 2013, p. 14). In 2018, UN-sponsored 
consultants identified three ‘outlying factions’ thought to retain arms and whose support is crucial to ensure 
implementation of remaining provisions of the BPA: 
• the MDF, led by Moses Pipiro and based around Panguna;
• the Twin Kingdom of Noah Musingku; and
• Damien Koike (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 50). 
Aside from the outlying factions, other categories of people thought to be in possession of weapons include: 
• arms traffickers; 
• businesses who use weapons to provide security for their premises and operations; 
• non-ex-combatant civilians who acquired weapons during or after the crisis, particularly young men; 
• a small number of private security companies that possess, or at least have easy access to, weapons; and
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• the BPS, officially unarmed yet with access to a range of weapons (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 16–17). 
There are a variety of reasons as to why people and groups in Bougainville could be reluctant to relinquish arms. 
In order of importance, the UN (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 17–18) provides the following list of motivations: 
• political uncertainty (e.g. will the Referendum be held? What will the outcome be? Will the PNG Parliament 
endorse the outcome? Will the PNG Defence Force be redeployed to Bougainville in the event that the PNG 
Parliament does not endorse the outcome?); 
• security (e.g. fear of retaliation for acts during the crisis; inter-clan/inter-faction conflicts; protection of 
business activities); 
• monetary (e.g. income through the illicit arms market); 
• criminal (e.g. trafficking in arms and illegally acquiring land);
• display of masculinity by young men (e.g. enhanced status and power among friends); and
• sentimental (e.g. an heirloom for the grandchildren of ex-combatants) (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 17–18). 
Adding to this list, Dennis Kuiai spoke at the National Conference on Bougainville Referendum about the 
historical status of weapons in Melanesian culture. A problem Kuiai identified, however, is that firearms are now 
being used in place of spears. Melanesian social structures and bilateral relations (e.g. with the Solomon Islands) 
also provide windows of opportunity for illicit trade (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 38). 
Trafficking in small arms to other parts of PNG and to Indonesia is a lucrative trade “due to price differentials 
that exist between the Solomon Islands, Bougainville and the final destinations of trafficked weapons” (UNDPA 
& UNDP, 2012, p. 15). The mark-up could range from 300–1,500 percent depending on their destination 
(UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 15). Recovered WWII weapons also fetch high prices on the black market 
(UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 13). A potential unintended consequence of weapons disposal in Bougainville is 
that “any reduction in the supply of readily available weapons and ammunition in Bougainville would lead to an 
increase in their black market value” (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 14). It is also possible that some people are 
holding onto weapons based on hopes for an official gun buy-back scheme (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 17). 
But the UN reports no plans for a buy-back scheme or “economic projects in exchange for weapons” (UNDPA 
& UNDP, 2012, p. 26). 
3.2.8  Engagement with ‘outlying factions’ 
From 2012, the ABG began a gradual shift away from a focus on weapons disposal exclusively to a more 
holistic approach focused on community development and security (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 26). This 
change stemmed from experiences gained in peacebuilding activities in the South of Bougainville (discussed 
later) (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 26).
There have been a number of positive steps towards disarmament in Bougainville through dialogue among the 
Me’ekamui fighters, and between ex-combatants and the ABG (UNDP, 2018). Former commanders, including 
Panguna Me’ekamui, have committed to make ‘Bougainville weapons free’4  no later than December 2018 (Joint 
Technical Team, 2018, p. 19). ABG officials have also been meeting with people such as Noah Musingku and 
Damien Koike (Joint technical Team, 2018, p. 51). 
Koike is said to be clear in his support of a peaceful referendum as he is confident it will lead to independence 
(Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 50). MDF leader, Moses Pipiro, has also declared his support for the referendum, 
whereas Musingku is thought to “be a harder nut to crack since his motivations for holding weapons presumably 
stem as much from concerns about his personal safety in view of his involvement in a failed pyramid scheme” 
(Joint technical Team, 2018, p. 50). It is also thought that some people and factions continue to retain weapons 
based on suspicions that the National Government will either not allow the referendum to occur or will reject 
a result in favour of independence (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 50; Radio New Zealand, 2016). Nisira 
4 The term ‘weapons-free Bougainville’ is used in commentary on weapons disposal in the lead-up to the referendum but it is not 
contained in the BPA (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 49). 
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(2017, p. 5), however, suggests these suspicions could be weakening as progress is made on preparations for the 
referendum. 
3.2.9  Reconciliation and unification 
The Peace Process Consultative Committee Resolution on Weapons Disposal contained in the BPA (Part E) 
recognises that “that weapons disposal and reconciliation are both mutually reinforcing and necessary to lasting 
peace by peaceful means”. Reconciliation between past adversaries and ‘unification’ of former Bougainville 
factions remains a peacebuilding priority. 
Bougainville has made significant progress towards reconciliation through collaborative approaches since the 
signing of the BPA. A major accomplishment was brokering the 2011 Konnou Peace Agreement, which ended 
a six-year localised conflict in the South of Bougainville (UNDP, 2018). While the ceasefire did not result in 
the handover of a significant number of weapons, “it did lay the foundation for intensified mediation and 
community-based peacebuilding efforts…” (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 24). Another important milestone 
occurred on 7 May 2017 when former BRA, Me’ekamui Government of Unity, Twin Kingdom factions and 
the MDF agreed to pursue peace by all means leading up to the referendum and beyond (Post Courier, 2017). 
Under the ABG House of Representatives’ Constituency Referendum Ready Concept, internal reconciliations 
are also occurring at the village and constituency level (Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville 
Affairs, 2017, p. 23). In 2018, mass reconciliations took place in five constituencies across Bougainville and 
resulted in the destruction of a number of firearms (of various sizes) and an active explosive (Joint Technical 
Team, 2018, p. 71). 
Women leaders and churches also continue to play an important role in promoting reconciliation in 
Bougainville. This includes facilitating joint conferences with national women’s organisations, as well as planning 
an interdenominational reconciliation in Arawa (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 71). Another category of 
reconciliations is ‘high profile cases’ involving former prominent political leaders (Joint Technical Team, 2018, 
p. 71). Yet some of these are incomplete, reasons for which include: waiting for the retrieval and repatriation of 
remains; unification among Me’ekamui factions; and awaiting the National Inquiry Report on the late Theodore 
Miriung case (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 71). 
Lack of money is considered to be one obstacle to reconciliation, as ceremonies require logistics, food and other 
items. The 2012 UN evaluation of weapons disposal, however, heard strong complaints that implementation 
of the reconciliation and weapons disposal components of the BPA “had turned into a money-making scheme” 
and that “this was undermining not only the Agreement itself but also some important Bougainville values 
and traditions” (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 11). Nonetheless, the Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on 
Bougainville Affairs (2017, p. 23) is of the view that “without an infusion of significant resources, there could 
be little time left to conduct a thorough reconciliation process throughout the AROB before the referendum”.
3.2.10  Recent weapons disposal activities 
In 2016, the ABG (2016d, p. 59) listed nine weapons disposal programmes as part of the Joint Bougainville 
Referendum work plan to occur between 2016 and 2018 with an unspecified budget. Activities listed during 
this period focused on information gathering (e.g. determining completion of the Weapons Disposal Plan under 
the BPA); the development of new strategies to address law and order issues associated with illegal firearms; and 
seeking external assistance (ABG, 2016d, p. 59). 
At a JSB meeting held on 15 December 2017, the two governments endorsed a resolution on the ‘Revised 
Four Phase Weapons Disposal Plan’ and rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants (Joint Technical 
Team, 2018, p. 39). The National Government will provide K12 million in budgetary support for the plan over 
three years (2018–2020), with a commitment of K7 million in the 2018 financial year. Overseen by the Joint 
Weapons Disposal Secretariat, the four ‘key result areas’ of the revised plan are: 
• awareness and sensitisation;
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• collection, registration and storage of firearms, ammunitions and explosives;
• disposal of weapons in accordance with the Decision on Final Fate of Disposal; and
• certification of weapons disposal compliance (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 39-46).
Guidelines have also been developed for the staging of a weapons disposal ceremony, or a ‘gun destruction day 
ceremony’. Such a ceremony would be intended as “an event involving a visit by a GOPNG [Government of 
PNG] representative for the purposes of witnessing a significant weapons destruction or disposal ceremony” 
(Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 54). The plan is focused at the district level and designed to be implemented by 
respective community governments.
Compared with the 2005 weapons disposal process, there is a stronger focus on district-level leadership and 
implementation. In the lead-up to the referendum, community government members across Bougainville will 
be required to undertake a weapons survey to ensure that each constituency can “declare themselves referendum 
ready by December 2018” (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 17–18). Instead of UNOMB certification, compliance 
will be marked by the public declaration of former combatants, Me’ekamui factions and other groups (Joint 
Technical Team, 2018, p. 47). Any remaining weapons found in Bougainville from January 2019 will be treated 
as a normal peacetime law and order issue under the PNG Firearms Act and all people “who continue to hold 
weapons after 31 December 2018 could face 10 years in jail and a fine of up to K10,000 (Joint Technical 
Team, 2018, p. 39). Both governments are to ensure adequate funding to support continued weapons disposal 
activities, and to seek technical and financial support from countries with WWII remnants in Bougainville (Joint 
Technical Team, 2018, p. 39). 
3.3	 Shortfalls	identified
3.3.1.  Limited data to assess the threat posed by weapons
In 2005, the UNOMB determined compliance on implementation of the BPA Weapons Disposal Plan. On 
paper, it is therefore technically complete. Yet it was known at the time of signing the BPA that this process 
would only secure a proportion of weapons in circulation. Doubts have also been raised about compliance with 
the Weapons Disposal Plan due to a number of weapons being stolen or never relinquished. It is also unclear 
how many weapons remain in Bougainville and there are discrepancies as to whether this number might be 
‘large’ or ‘small’. This makes it difficult to assess the magnitude of the threat posed by firearms relative to other 
‘weapons’ such as bladed instruments that are readily available. This reinforces the need to expand emphases on 
a peaceful referendum beyond a focus on weapons disposal exclusively, and to continue to support reconciliation 
and unification activities. 
3.3.2  Localised conflict, incomplete reconciliation and political uncertainty
A notable limitation in the BPA provisions is that no formal weapons disposal process immediately followed 
the UNOMB supervised Weapons Disposal Plan, and progress since 2005 is widely evaluated as slow. Firearms 
have been put to use in localised conflicts and there are fears that local conflicts could escalate, or re-escalate, in 
the name of the referendum outcome (Ipp & Cooper, 2013, p. 12). Incomplete reconciliations and unresolved 
hostilities heighten this risk. 
Reasons for holding onto weapons are diverse but political uncertainty is a key issue. Reducing this uncertainty 
will take time and some may not feel appeased until the final outcome is endorsed by the PNG Parliament. An 
important lesson to be drawn from the UNOMB-supervised process is that momentum on disarmament activities 
can be lost when tied to political processes with a finite deadline. It appears similarly important to develop 
strategies to maintain the current impetus towards unification and reconciliation following the referendum.
3.3.3  Criminal activities
A final noteworthy issue is that there are thought to be a number of weapons holders in Bougainville who are not 
ex-combatants and whose motivations are not political (e.g. monetary and criminal). Paradoxically, it is thought 
that progress on weapons disposal could be increasing sales prices of firearms on the black market, potentially 
heightening financial incentives to hold onto weapons. Although these weapons might be conceived of as a ‘law 
and order issue’, rather than one of post-conflict disarmament, the presence and misuse of firearms during the 
referendum could jeopardise evaluations of the vote as ‘free and fair’ (discussed later). 
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This chapter outlines the key BPA provisions for the Bougainville referendum and provides an update on 
preparations. This is followed by an introduction to relevant literature on ‘good governance’ and ‘free and fair’ 
due to the inclusion of these concepts in the BPA.
4.1 Key provisions
‘Agreed principles for the Bougainville Referendum’ are set out in detail in Part C of the BPA. Through 
amendments to the National Constitution, the Bougainville referendum is guaranteed but the outcome is non-
binding. It is therefore “technically ‘consultative’ only” (Regan, 2016b, p. 5). In the spirit of the BPA as a 
joint creation, implementation of the result is to occur through consultation between the two governments. 
If an agreement is reached, the result can be referred to the National Parliament as the final decision-making 
authority (Bougainville Referendum Communications Committee, 2016, p. 4). In the event of disagreement, 
Bougainville’s existing autonomy arrangements under the powers of the BPA will continue until a final decision 
is made (Bougainville Referendum Communications Committee, 2016, p. 3). 
4.1.1  The question(s)
There are no limitations on the number of options to be made available in the referendum, but one option must 
include separate independence for Bougainville. Despite this flexibility, the referendum is generally thought of 
as a choice between two options: independence or continued autonomy and the two governments very recently 
agreed (October 2018) that the question posed to voters will be: 
Do you agree for Bougainville to have (i) Greater Autonomy or (ii) Independence? (Kenneth, 
2018).
Yet some participants at the National Conference on Bougainville Referendum argued that even limiting 
the options to a choice between independence or autonomy risks definitional problems such as the degree of 
autonomy sought-after and/or the time at which independence should commence. At the same time, it was 
acknowledged that there is a need for simplicity as autonomy ‘is confusing for the people’. 
4.1.2  Eligibility
The BPA states that “eligibility to vote in the national elections will be the same as for national elections in 
Bougainville plus non-resident Bougainvilleans (detailed criteria to be finalised through consultation)” (2001, 
Part C (15)). One source of controversy is that non-Bougainvillean citizens of PNG will be eligible to vote in the 
referendum, “subject only to having been resident [in Bougainville] for six months” (Maclellan & Regan, 2018, 
p. 12). There was, however, clear agreement on this aspect of the BPA during the peace negotiations (Maclellan 
& Regan, 2018, p. 12).
At a JSB meeting held on 29 June 2018, the two governments agreed that a non-resident Bougainvillean eligible 
to vote in the referendum is a person who is: 
…Bougainvillean, as defined in Section 7(1) of the Bougainville Constitution; and entitled to 
enrolment under Section 52(1) of the Organic Law on National and Local-level Government 
Elections for an electorate in Papua New Guinea outside the AROB (JSB, 2018, p. 5). 
Voting in the referendum is not compulsory and “there are no provisions setting a quorum for either voter 
turnout or results” (Maclellan & Regan, 2018, p. 12).
4.1.3  The conduct of the referendum 
At a JSB meeting in May 2016, the two governments agreed to establish an independent administrative agency, 
the Bougainville Referendum Commission (BRC), to prepare for and conduct the referendum (Maclellan & 
Regan, 2018, p. 13). The establishment of the BRC under the BRC Charter signed in August 2017 officially 
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kick-started electoral preparations for the referendum (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, n.d., p. 
2). The BRC is responsible for the design of the ballot paper and translation of the agreed question. The BRC 
comprises seven members: the PNG and Bougainville electoral commissioners and two members each from the 
national government and the ABG, one male and one female (Muapi, 2017). The ABG has appointed Patrick 
Nisira and Ruby Mirinka, while the PNG Government has appointed Professor Thomas Webster and Robert 
Igara. Bertie Ahern has been confirmed as Chair of the BRC, chosen on the basis of his involvement in the 
Northern Ireland peace process (Dineen, 2018). 
The main ‘stumbling block’ to the operation of the BRC to date is funding (Maclellan & Regan, 2018, p. 13). 
According to Maclellan and Regan (2018, p. 13):
 …the indicative budget developed by the BRC indicates the total budget for the referendum will 
be around K127 million (about AU$51 million). However as yet only K500,000 allocated by the 
ABG is available, while K20 million promised by the national government towards meeting 2018 
costs has yet to be released. 
Delays in the release of funds could be pushing back important preparatory work for the referendum, such as 
compilation of voter rolls (Maclellan & Regan, 2018, p. 13).
4.1.4  Timing 
A vote must be held no later than 15 years after the election of the first ABG which was inaugurated in 2005 
under President Joseph Kabui. Although a target date for the referendum has been set, the actual date is yet 
to be confirmed. It could be held on a date later than 15 June 2019, so long as it occurs before 15 June 2020. 
One problem noted is that the target date “has since become widely accepted in Bougainville as the actual date” 
(Maclellan & Regan, 2018, p. 12). But the actual date cannot be determined until the two governments consult 
over two conditions listed in the BPA: 
• weapons disposal; and
• good governance (BPA, 2001, Part C (312 (b)). 
Reference to these two conditions in the BPA has been a source of considerable confusion. There is misunderstanding 
among key stakeholders that a lack of good governance and/or inadequate progress on weapons disposal can stop 
the referendum from going ahead, or that they are ‘pre-conditions’ for holding the referendum. Significantly, this 
includes warnings made by Prime Minister O’Neill that the referendum might not be possible if Bougainville 
does not fulfil these conditions (Radio New Zealand, 2017a). As already stated, this is incorrect as the referendum 
is constitutionally guaranteed, with the only exception that the ABG decides in accordance with the Bougainville 
Constitution that it should not be held (The Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, 2004, 
Sec. 194 (2)). This is unlikely given ABG President, John Momis’, statement in response to O’Neill:
…They [weapons disposal and good governance] are considerations that we need to take into 
account in determining the date for the referendum. That’s all. The referendum is inevitable. It’s 
been decided. We will have a referendum (Radio New Zealand, 2017c).
At the National Conference on Bougainville Referendum in June 2018, Prime Minister O’Neill assured the 
audience that Bougainville has the right to a referendum and stated that no government is going to stop it from 
going ahead. 
4.1.5 Weapons disposal 
As discussed earlier, the BPA outlines a formal Weapons Disposal Plan and a procedure for establishing compliance 
on implementation of this Plan. The National Constitution (Sec. 338(3)(b)) also states that consideration of 
weapons disposal is to be conducted “in accordance with the Agreement”. The BPA “is silent, however, on 
what would constitute adequate progress on weapons disposal” (UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 10). Nonetheless, 
weapons disposal is expected to be considered in setting the referendum date as there is widespread agreement 
among Bougainville leaders, including leaders of former combatant groups, that further weapons disposal is 
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needed (Maclellan & Regan, 2018, p. 11). 
4.1.6  Good governance 
The BPA (2001, Part C (313 (a)) provides a definition of good governance that can be thought of as comprising 
an international and a local dimension. The BPA states:
…the benchmarks to be used in determining good governance will take account of internationally 
accepted standards of good governance as they are applicable and implemented in the circumstances 
of Bougainville and the rest of Papua New Guinea. These benchmarks include democracy and 
opportunities for participation by Bougainvilleans, transparency, and accountability, as well as 
respect for human rights and the rule of law, including the Constitution of Papua New Guinea 
(BPA, Part C (313 (a)). 
Evaluations as to whether the ABG is performing in accordance with international standards of good governance 
“shall be determined in accordance with the review and the dispute resolution procedure” (Constitution of 
Papua New Guinea, Sec. 338 (4)). As stated elsewhere in this report, the second of these reviews is underway 
and a report is expected in December 2018. According to Maclellan and Regan (2018, p. 11), “if for any reason 
the review does not occur, then the governments would not be able to meet the requirement for taking good 
governance issues into account” but the referendum would still need to be held before mid-June 2020.
4.1.7  Defining ‘good governance’ 
The notion of good governance is ambiguous as there is no universal guideline as to how it should be measured 
and achieved (Office of the High Commissioner Human Rights, 1996-2018). Some analysts start with a more 
general definition of ‘governance’, to clarify what ‘good governance’ might mean (Graham et al., 2003, p. 1). 
The international literature tells us that governance is not merely a synonym for ‘government’ (Graham et al., 
2003, p. 1; Weiss, 2000, p. 800). Governance includes, but also transcends, the formal government apparatus 
(Weiss, 2000, p. 800). A public policy issue could be considered to stem from a problem of ‘governance’ but 
this does not mean “that the onus for ‘fixing’ it necessarily rests with government” (Graham et al., 2003, p. 
1). The sovereign state is just one source of power (Braithwaite, 1999, p. 90) and many other individuals and 
institutions, both public and private, play an important governing role in society (Weiss, 2000, p. 795–796). 
Governance therefore, is “about how governments and other social organizations interact, how they relate to 
citizens, and how decisions are taken in a complex world” (Graham et al., 2003, p. 1). Key entities involved in 
governance include: government, the private sector, military, media and civil society, and interactions between 
these institutions and citizens are influenced by traditions, history, culture and technology (Graham et al., 2003, 
p. 1–2). 
4.1.8  Governance in Bougainville 
At the everyday level of Bougainville’s rural communities, non-state authorities such as churches, elders and 
chiefs also play an important governing role (Boege, 2014, p. 247). As these categories are a modern product 
of the interaction between local indigenous societies and external forces, however, there can be disagreements 
and uncertainty as to who is a ‘real’ chief (Boege, 2014, p. 247). In practice, and with ramifications for current 
weapons disposal activities, ‘traditional chiefs’ can find it difficult to exert their authority over competing 
leadership sources, such as those that command loyalty from young people and/or are in possession of firearms 
(Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 13, p. 24; UNDPA & UNDP, 2012, p. 
22). 
Each of these different sources of authority in Bougainville, whether ‘traditional’, governmental or religious, do 
not operate in silos. Rather, they intersect with, and mutually reinforce, one another in ways that often enhance 
stability in communities (Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs (2017, p. 10). It might 
be more helpful, therefore, to think of governance in Bougainville as comprising a number of ‘hybrids’ (Boege, 
2014, p. 248), rather than clearly demarcated powers. It is important to acknowledge this in the lead-up to the 




The origins and complexity of governance in PNG nationwide is beyond the scope of this paper.5  Yet it is 
important to note that PNG has long been the subject of international concern regarding governance standards, 
particularly about transparency, law and order, poor education and health services, and gender inequality 
(Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.). Relevant also to a ‘free and fair’ 
referendum (discussed later) is that Transparency International PNG (2017, p. iii) heavily criticised the 2017 
PNG National Parliamentary elections to be “flawed to an unforgiveable extent”. Reasons for this include: 
security and election-related violence; bribery and intimidation; double, multiple and block voting; and lack of 
election awareness. 
4.1.9  Measuring and evaluating good governance in Bougainville
Due to ambiguities in defining governance, delineating principles of ‘good’ governance is difficult and controversial 
(Graham et al., 2003, p. 1–2). There are, however, a number of characteristics commonly emphasised. The UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2009), for example, lists eight principles: 
• participation;




• equity and inclusiveness; 
• effectiveness and efficiency; and
• accountability. 
The 2013 Joint Review also outlines five different points of view (see Table 3) as to how good governance can be 
measured (JSB, 2013, p. 62). 
Table 3: Five `points of view on measuring good governance (JSB, 2013, p. 62–69)
Perspective Indicators
Section 338(5) of the 
Constitution indicators
• democracy
• opportunities for Participation by Bougainvilleans
• transparency and accountability
• human rights and the rule of law
UNDP view • legitimacy and voice (participation and consensus orientation)
• direction (strategic vision)
• performance (responsiveness; effectiveness and efficiency)
• accountability (transparency)
• fairness (equity and rule of law)
5 For an examination of policy-making and public-sector reform in PNG since independence, see May (2009). 
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Perspective Indicators
ABG view • an ideal difficult to achieve in totality
• BPA and National Constitution indicators
• apply good governance benchmarks “as they are applicable and implemented in 
the circumstances of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea as a whole”
International indices • UNDP’s Human Development Index
• Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
• Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index
• World Bank’s Governance Matters Series 






• Provincial and District Management Team Work
• management team relations with stakeholders
• performance management
• managing the budget and financial systems with the province
• managing human resources
• managing the assets of the province
Of these different perspectives, the 2013 Joint Review (JSB, 2013, p. 62–64) responds in greatest detail to 
Section 338 (5) of the National Constitution indicators. The review Team did not intend to use the international 
indices in the review for reasons including: 
• many of the indicators are inappropriate to Bougainville now; 
• little data is available for an assessment under these indices; 
• the independent experts did not have the resources to undertake the research to collect the data; and 
• the ABG does not have responsibility for many of the areas of assessment (JSB, 2013, p. 66). 
The 2013 Joint Review’s (JSB, 2013, p. 69) overall assessment of good governance in Bougainville is “that it is 
doubtful if it could be said that Bougainville was achieving the required standard of good governance as at mid-
2013”. Reasons provided for this include:
• weak capacity and poor compliance with recognised good practice, even in the PNG context;
• serious capacity issues in the competencies of individuals and the capability of various parts of the 
administration of government to do their respective tasks; and 
• in other broader areas there is simply a lack of data which makes it impossible to make a valid assessment 
(JSB, 2013, p. 69). 
A second autonomy review is vital to understanding any improvements that have been made on good governance 
over the past five years. 
4.1.10  Contested legitimacy 
As already stated, the BPA requires that international benchmarks of good governance be considered based 
on their applicability to the particular circumstances of Bougainville and the rest of PNG (BPA, 2001, Part C 
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(313 (a)). A range of groups and individuals vie for authority in Bougainville and therefore appeal to different 
audiences. At the government level, the ABG is recognised as the official governing body of the AROB and 
“Bougainville has a vibrant and working system of elected government at the upper level” (JSB, 2013, p. 63). The 
ABG also has the authority to represent all Bougainvilleans in preparations for the referendum (Nisira, 2017, p. 
4). Yet there are a number of ongoing contests against the ABG, including the presence of a road block at Morgan 
Junction, which still limits access to the Panguna area at times (Nisira, 2017, p. 5). Former combatant leaders 
have also become more politically active, some of whom hold business interests (e.g. relationships with mining 
investors) and have sought to bypass the ABG to advance these interests (Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee 
on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 25). Finally, recent events indicate that the Bougainville administration can be 
easily disrupted. This became highly evident at the National Conference on Bougainville Referendum, to which 
President Momis and other Bougainville leaders arrived a day late due to the forced closure of Buka Airport by 
disgruntled workers (Radio New Zealand, 2018). An observation made in 2006 by Wolfers (2006, p. 9), that the 
ABG’s authority is not Bougainville wide, therefore appears to remain pertinent today. 
In part, this situation has arisen as a result of some individuals and groups not joining the peace process from its 
very beginning. The conflict itself also caused many opposing factions, deep divisions and mistrust (Nisira, 2017, 
p. 5). As discussed earlier, however, the ABG has made significant engagements with outlying factions – some of 
which have pledged their support for a peaceful referendum. 
4.1.11  ‘Free and fair’
Additional to weapons disposal and good governance, the BPA states that “the referendum will be free and 
fair” (BPA, 2001, Part C (317)). The UN has used the term ‘free and fair’ in the context of referendums on 
independence since the 1950s (Elkit & Svensson, 1997, p. 32), but it is more commonly used in relation to 
general elections. Free and fair elections, although not an end in themselves, are seen as an essential requirement 
for “any state to be considered truly democratic” (UNDP, 2014, p. 3).  
The international community will be keen to declare the Bougainville referendum has been free and fair, and 
the BPA (2001, Part C (319)) states that “international observers will be invited to observe the conduct of the 
referendum”. This would take the form of declarations by international observer groups (e.g. Commonwealth 
Secretariat, Transparency International, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat) that the referendum has been 
conducted in a peaceful atmosphere, and that polling stations have been run in an effective and transparent 
manner.6   
Significantly, Bougainville has already held a series of elections declared free and fair by international observers 
(Australian High Commission PNG, 2015; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2010). Regarding the 2005 ABG 
elections, for example, the UN Security Council (2005) reported that “despite some minor reported incidents, 
all eligible voters had been given the opportunity to vote in a calm and peaceful environment, and the outcome 
had reflected accurately the will of the people of Bougainville”. The referendum will also benefit from procedural 
lessons learned through past elections such as problems with the electoral roll (ABC, 2015) and protecting 
illiterate voters from interference (ABC, 2015). Yet the focus of the referendum differs considerably from an 
election in that it will rely heavily on the performance of new institutions (especially the BRC) and the political 
will of both governments to negotiate the result.  
4.1.12  Characteristics of free and fair 
Similar to good governance, there is no internationally accepted definition of ‘free and fair’ and the BPA does 
not offer specific benchmarks. Entities that suport free and fair elections in post conflict societies do, however, 
provide an indication of the types of issues that get considered. The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID, 2018) for example, outlines 10 elements to fair elections and political processes:
1. Impartial electoral framework;
6 See for example, the joint international observation media statement on the 2015 ABG election (Australian High Commission 
PNG, 2015). 
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2. Credible electoral administration; 
3. Effective oversight of electoral processes; 
4. Informed and active citizens;
5. Representative and competitive multi-party systems; 
6. Effective governance by elected leaders and bodies; 
7. Inclusion of women and disadvantaged groups;
8. Effective transfer of political power;
9. Consensus-building for democratic reform; and 
10. Sustainable local engagement. 
In contrast to specific criteria, a Transparency International PNG (2017, p. 19) observation questionnaire 
provides voters with a set of ‘situations’ to determine voter perspectives on the 2017 national parliamentary 
elections: 
• voters being offered bribery or asking for bribery to vote for a particular candidate;
• voters being threatened if they do not vote for a particular candidate; 
• voters not being able to vote in secret; 
• voters not being able to vote by themselves; and
• late start of polling time causing voters to miss out.
It is also important to note that determinations as to whether an election has been free and fair extend beyond 
what occurs on polling day itself (Ndulo & Lulo, 2010, p. 158). One ‘checklist’ for example, divides the process 
into three linear stages: 
1. before polling day (e.g. freedom of movement and impartial voter education programmes);
2. on polling day (e.g. opportunity to participate in the election and secrecy of the ballot); and 
3. after polling day (e.g. legal possibilities of complaint and acceptance of the election results by everyone 
involved) (Elkit & Svensson, 1997).
Also notable in Elkit and Svensson’s (1997) checklist is that ‘freeness’ tends be associated with opportunities to 
participate without fear (e.g. freedom of movement and speech), while ‘fairness’ is more aligned to procedural 
issues (e.g. transparency of the voting process and secrecy of the ballot).
4.1.13  Does context matter?
The BPA does not state that free and fair should be determined as applicable to the unique circumstances of 
Bougainville nor the rest of PNG. Classifications of free and fair by the international community can at times be 
at odds with indigenous values and local concepts (Hohe, 2002, p. 69). Transparency International PNG (2017, 
p. 19), for example, reports that “the issue of bribery is complex in the Melanesian culture of reciprocity. People 
receive gifts in cash and kind from candidates especially during the campaign period, but often do not regard 
these handouts as bribes”. International agencies such as USAID however, assert that “a country cannot be truly 
democratic until its citizens have the opportunity to choose their representatives through elections that are free 
and fair” (USAID, 2018). 
Some commentators argue that context also matters in that elections conducted in post-conflict societies “should 
not be judged solely by the standards of well-established democracies” (Ndulo & Lulo, 2010, p. 165). Rather, 
the primary purpose is to establish whether the results “overall, reflect the will of the people, and whether the 
election advances the peace process and the establishment of democratic dispensation” (Ndulo & Lulo, 2010, p. 
165). Ndulo and Lulo (2010, p. 165) cite the example of the 1994 South African elections which had suffered 
some logistical and administrative problems in parts of the country. Instead of declaring the election ‘free and 
fair’, international observer groups agreed to use the term “the election reflected the will of the people” (Ndulo 
& Lulo, 2010, p. 166). This example has relevance to the Bougainville referendum due to the aforementioned 
procedural issues experienced in past elections, as well as the logistical challenges of reaching Bougainville’s 
remote communities.
4.2	 Shortfalls	identified
In summary, preparations on the referendum are underway and a number of important milestones have been 
reached, most notably, establishing the BRC; setting the criteria of eligibility for non-resident Bougainvilleans; and 
agreeing the referendum question. Yet time is running short and there have been a number of misunderstandings 
around good governance and weapons disposal. The BPA provides little guidance as to what constitutes 
adequate weapons disposal, beyond compliance with the Weapons Disposal Plan. While definitions of good 
governance are vague, broad characteristics and benchmarks do provide some guidance on key principles to 
consider. Concerning, however, is the 2013 Joint Review’s finding that as of mid-2013, Bougainville was falling 
short of standards of good governance and without a second autonomy review, the two governments cannot be 
said to have considered good governance. The referendum must be free and fair but there are also definitional 
imitations to this concept. Still, international observers will want to affirm that the referendum was held in a safe 
environment, conducted through a transparent process, and reflects the ‘will of the people’. 
The findings of this report suggest the key risks to the conduct of a credible referendum, insofar as the international 
community is concerned, are: 
• the vote is viewed as not reflecting the free will of the people of Bougainville;
• the hasty transfer of powers in the lead-up to the referendum is undertaken without due regard to local 
human and financial capacity; and
• the presence of weapons and/or spoilers obstructing voting thus undermining the credibility of the 
referendum.
The concluding chapter expands on these risks and suggests ways in which they might be mitigated or prepared 
for. 
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Significant achievements have been made towards peace building in Bougainville since the signing of the BPA. 
The absence of large-scale violence is unquestionable evidence of the strengths of the agreement. A number of 
key milestones in the implementation of the BPA have been reached, most notably, the establishment of the 
ABG under a Bougainville Constitution and UN certification of compliance on implementation of the Weapons 
Disposal Plan. It is acknowledged, however, that there have been some shortfalls in the implementation of the 
three pillars of the BPA. Two key themes highlighted in this report are: 
• Bougainville has the potential to exercise wide powers and functions as intended by the BPA, yet effective 
implementation of these powers has been limited by resourcing and coordination problems in the ABG, 
weak collaboration with the National Government and delayed payments of grants; and 
• implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan contained in the BPA is technically complete. Yet an unknown 
number of weapons remain in circulation, and numerous armed groups and individuals are thought to 
continue to pose a threat to the ongoing peace process.
This discussion now turns to possible implications of these gaps on preparations, conduct and the outcome of 
the referendum. 
5.1 Autonomy: transfer and exercise of powers and functions as per   
 BPA
The current status of the transfer of powers and functions from the National Government is unclear. This lack 
of clarity could lead voters to underestimate the number and/or type of powers and functions currently vested 
in the National Government, as well as the gradual process that will need to follow a vote in favour of a change 
to Bougainville’s political status (Maclellan & Regan, 2018, p. 15). What is clear however, is that progress 
is evaluated as slow, incohesive and has suffered coordination problems between the two governments. With 
possibly less than six months (depending on the release date of this report) left before the target date for the 
referendum, it is unlikely that the full list of powers and functions available to the ABG will be transferred before 
polling day. 
A risk in the lead-up to the referendum, and in the period after the result is known, is a hasty transfer of remaining 
powers and functions. This could diminish the recognised need for capacity, human and financial resourcing 
needed to develop policies and regulations to make effective use of those powers and functions. This could both 
exacerbate existing weaknesses in service delivery in Bougainville across a range of sectors (e.g. health, education 
and law and justice) and heighten frustrations among the community, which may hold unrealistic expectations 
for immediate outcomes following the vote. It might also reinforce coordination problems between the ABG and 
some National Government departments (JSB, 2013, p. 61) at a particularly sensitive time in this relationship.
It appears vital, therefore, that both governments clarify the current status of Bougainville’s autonomy 
arrangements as envisioned by the BPA. This could include, for example, an outline of the powers and functions 
yet to be drawdown, a timeline for remaining transfers and resourcing needs. This information would helpfully 
be contained in the second autonomy review.
The completion of the second autonomy review is also vital for the consideration of good governance. Principles 
of good governance such as transparent and responsive institutions, rule of law and the promotion of human 
rights are important to foreign donors as they are thought to provide the “foundations for economic growth, 
private sector investment and trade” (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018-
19). A promise of support from the international community to uphold the result of the referendum was a key 
factor in the acceptance of a delayed referendum among Bougainville parties to the BPA, but this support does 
not appear unconditional. 
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Conclusion: Risks and implications for 
the referendum
Ch.5
5.2 Voter decision-making and heightened scrutiny of the ABG and   
 National Government
Inadequate information on autonomy and its outcomes could mean that voters will base their decision on 
factors other than evidence-based evaluations of a higher degree of autonomy or an independent Bougainville. 
The emphasis on a potential resumption of mining at Panguna to fund independence, for example, could lead 
voters to base their decision on whether they are for or against mining. A participant at the National Conference 
on Bougainville Referendum also raised uncertainty around currency and the need for a passport to travel 
throughout PNG as factors that might inform voter decision-making. 
As highlighted in Chapter 1, evaluations of autonomy reveal significant frustrations among the Bougainville 
public towards the ABG for lack of progress made in the implementation of the autonomy arrangements, tangible 
outcomes and engagement with the community. Preparations for the referendum provide both governments an 
opportunity to highlight the services that have been restored and can be attributed to autonomy. The referendum 
also presents an opportunity for the ABG to increase dialogue with the community, and young people in 
particular, to bridge the observed communication gap. It is also a chance for the ABG to outline a vision for the 
future of Bougainville, something which the 2013 Joint Review found to be lacking (JSB, 2013, p. 28). 
In the lead-up to the referendum, the two governments will also likely face a number of unique challenges as 
a result of heightened public scrutiny. The ABG for example, has suffered instances of institutional corruption 
and fraud (ABG, 2018, p. 1). Further revelations of this kind could weaken trust in its integrity and at worst, 
risk disruptions to the Bougainville administration (e.g. through protests or boycotts). A particular focus point 
for the National Government, on the other hand, is the repayment of monies owing to the ABG. Community 
consultations held in Bougainville reveal this to be a prevalent concern among the Bougainville public 
(Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 12). Doubts raised as to whether the 
National Government will be in a financial position to meet the agreed on repayments of RDG grants for either 
2018 or 2019 (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 66) suggest this is a risk that may need a proactive approach. 
There are already serious concerns about a lack of understanding of the BPA provisions among political leaders 
and the general public. A possible implication of this on the referendum is the continued proliferation of 
misunderstandings around all stages of the voting process. A particular risk is if the National Government 
is perceived to be delaying, obstructing or rejecting the result of the vote. Political uncertainty and mistrust 
are reasons that some people may continue to retain firearms. Incorrect or misleading information about the 
referendum could diminish the good efforts that have been made to engage ‘outlying factions’ in the peace 
process. As people in Bougainville are thought to be worried about inadequate collaboration between the two 
governments, and the effectiveness of the JSB in particular (Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville 
Affairs (2017, p. 12), strengthening confidence in this body could be a further avenue to reaffirm and revitalise 
the BPA as a joint creation. 
5.3 Weapons disposal, security and risks to a free and fair referendum
One issue that ties the shortfalls of autonomy and weapons disposal together are concerns about the capacity 
and resourcing of the BPS. The BPS operates within a framework of national law and has been referred to 
disparagingly in some parts of Bougainville as the ‘PNG Police’ (Dinnen & Peake, 2013b, p. 576). Providing 
security for the referendum and handling law and order disruptions therefore appear to be particularly sensitive 
issues for all stakeholders to manage, especially given the historical link between the actions of security personnel 
and the escalation of the Bougainville conflict. 
Previous successes in resolving localised armed conflict in Bougainville point to the strengths of collaborative 
approaches. The CAP in particular, has attracted praise from the UN (UN, 2016, p. 29). This suggests an 
important role that CAP officers could play in promoting a safe and secure referendum in their communities. 
As many CAP offices already undertake functions beyond policing (Dinnen & Peake, 2013a, p. 1), they might 
also be tasked with awareness raising and ongoing reconciliation activities. Yet, as Dinnen and Peake (2013b, 
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p. 580–581) argue, it is important not to overstate the strengths of the CAP as a professional police service and 
restoration of infrastructure destroyed during the conflict is still needed to meet a rise in public disorder.
Although inadequate data means it is difficult to estimate the threat posed by weapons in Bougainville, all 
stakeholders are concerned about their ongoing presence. An important lesson to be drawn from the UNOMB-
supervised process is that momentum on disarmament activities can easily be lost once a political milestone has 
been attained, suggesting the need for a long-term engagement well beyond referendum polling day. 
A further risk associated with the presence of weapons and ‘No Go Zones’ (e.g. the road block at Morgan 
Junction) is that they could undermine the notion of a free and fair referendum. Weapons use could be seen as 
a threat to vote for a particular outcome (Joint Technical Team, 2018, p. 52) and if violent incidents were to 
occur, there are fears that the National Parliament might use this as a reason not to ratify the result. It could also 
jeopardise pressure from the international community on the National Parliament in the event of a disagreement 
between the two governments. 
It is also important to note that non-violent actions could similarly be seen to be at odds with a free and fair 
referendum. The forcible closure of Buka Airport in June 2018 and roadblocks, for example, also limit ‘freedom 
of movement’. Momis’ speech to the National Conference on Bougainville Referendum highlighted the period 
after the result as particularly crucial. In preparation for the referendum, Momis called for all parties to agree not 
to use weapons, and in the event that the National Government does not immediately support the outcome, to 
disarm and negotiate.
As discussed in Chapter 2, efforts have been made to ensure freedom of mobility and there are positive signs 
that former BRA, Me’ekamui Government of Unity, Twin Kingdom factions and the MDF will pursue peace 
by peaceful means before, during and after the referendum (Post Courier, 2017). Unification and reconciliation 
among former adversaries, however, are incomplete. One fear is that unresolved tensions could risk renewed 
conflict during the referendum period (Ipp & Cooper, 2013, p. 12). A particular danger is that localised conflict, 
in which weapons have been used in the past, could re-emerge under the umbrella of the referendum outcome 
(Ipp & Cooper, 2013, p. 12). There is also potential for ‘spoilers’ to disrupt the referendum vote and which 
would threaten the security of voters. For those who are against independence “disrupting the poll – a high 
profile event – could be perceived as an effective protest strategy” (Ipp & Cooper, 2013, p. 11). A split between 
ex-combatant groups would also pose a serious security risk to the conduct of the referendum (Tanis cited in 
Dateline Pacific, 2017). Emotions during the referendum will be running high as individuals and groups “try to 
make sense of an uncertain and unpredictable political future” (Ipp & Cooper, 2013, p. 11). The outcome will 
never be unanimous (Woodbury, 2015, p. 14–16) and without continued efforts towards reconciliation, there is 
a risk that the referendum could resurface old divisions.
5.4 Awareness raising and equal opportunity to participate
The ABG has been working to distribute information on the referendum through awareness raising materials 
and collaborations between ABG members, community governments, young people and women to make 
Bougainville ‘referendum ready’ (Radio New Zealand, 2018c). But there are significant practical challenges 
to informing voters of the Referendum arrangements which are seen as essential to guaranteeing an equal 
opportunity to participate. First, “it is said that between 50-60 percent of the AROB population is either illiterate 
or are not educated to adequate levels” (Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs, 2017, p. 
15). Second, much of the infrastructure needed to support communication channels was destroyed during the 
conflict (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 2). Third, there are geographical challenges to reaching Bougainville’s remote 
communities and it is understood that women have lower access to media sources than men (Thomas et al., 
2017, p. 2). It seems particularly important to clarify the exact date (as opposed to the target date) as soon as 
possible to dispel fears, particularly among those people believed to have firearms, that the National Government 
will stop the referendum from being held. Any obstruction to participation in the referendum could heighten 
the risk of individuals and groups believing that the agreed principles of referendum have not been applied justly.
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5.5 Opportunities
The referendum on Bougainville’s future political is the next major milestone towards implementation of the 
BPA. One of the strengths of a delayed referendum is that it draws attention to the achievements and weaknesses 
in implementation of the autonomy arrangements and Weapons Disposal Plan contained in the BPA. Rather 
than focusing on the identified shortfalls as negatives, however, they can also be seen as providing important 
insights into how the PNG National Government and the ABG can continue to strengthen peace in Bougainville, 
regardless of the referendum outcome. These opportunities point towards: 
• a considered approach to the handover of remaining powers and functions to the ABG;
• enhanced collaboration between the two governments and revitalisation of the concept of the BPA as a joint 
creation; 
• fostering deeper connections between the ABG and the broader community; and 
• maintaining current momentum on disarmament, unification and reconciliation. 
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